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# The Emergence of Taiwanese Nationalism: A Preliminary Work on an Approach to Interactive Episodic Discourse\*

Wei-Der Shu

"Political regimes may determine an official 'identity' for a people but, subjectively, the identified may contest this designation." --- Gold, 1993: 173

"Anyone's horizon of experience ... is unlikely to be fixed by a single collectivity or categorical framework." --- Calhoun, 1995: xix

## Introduction

In a call for core and comprehensive bibliographies of Taiwan Studies, John Shufelt expresses that "Names are significant. Exactly what they signify has sometimes been the cause of serious dispute, and it is right that we should take care to call things by their proper names" (Shufelt, 1997: 1). Indeed, few issues occupy a more central place than national identity, or "what's in a name?", on the future political agenda in Taiwan. For many decades, a notable theme of political debate in Taiwan has been the "naming" of this semitropical island, which has been known or identified, variously, as "*Formosa*," "*The Republic of China*," "*Chinese-Taipei*," "*Taipei, China*," "*The Republic of China on Taiwan*," "*Taiwan*," or arguably, "*The Republic of Taiwan*." Especially in the 1990s, of all the phenomena that characterized the history of the past several years, the emergence of competing assertions of nationhood has had the most dramatic impact on the political landscape of that island state.

For the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang,<sup>1</sup> hereafter KMT), its existing government on Taiwan, *Republic of China*

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(hereafter ROC), was only an extension of the unfinished Chinese civil war.<sup>2</sup> Its rule on Taiwan, after Chiang Kai-Shek's fiasco in the civil war, was based on the claim that the KMT was the sole legitimate carrier of the ROC's constitutional continuity (*fa-tung*),<sup>3</sup> and therefore Taiwan was a part of ROC's territory. Basically, the KMT government in Taiwan could be seen as an émigré regime which was established out of internal structural conditions of Taiwanese society. Saying that it was constantly at war with the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP), the KMT claimed that it had to maintain martial law, prohibit freedom of speech, the press, association, and the other basic human and political rights stipulated in the 1947 constitution. In this sense, the KMT government not only took the recovery of mainland China as its primary target, but also left no room for local political ambition and tolerated no resistance. From the KMT's perspective, the CCP was chosen as the major target, and *mainland recovery* was set up as the primary concern.

Confronting the oppression of this Mainlander-KMT regime, and especially after the popular unrest of 1947, which claimed perhaps 10,000 – 20,000 Taiwanese lives, the die-hard opposition forces in Taiwan have built their reservoir of resistance and growth upon ethnic cleavage. The 1947 resistance movement was temporarily submerged, but a salient ethnic cleavage on Taiwan's political landscape was deeply and structurally inscribed. To many native Taiwanese, "Mainlanders and their regime" were responsible for the heinous abuse and slaughter in this tragedy. Since then, the opposition has tried to capitalize on Taiwan consciousness, the idea that *Taiwan belongs to Taiwanese*, as a rallying point to form a unified political body. To these opposition leaders, the KMT government, which was framed as a "foreign colonial power" due to its unfortunate, if not intentional, massacre of the Taiwanese elite and its oppressive measures, was their principal locus for constructing a counter political discourse. This framing was different from that of the ruling KMT, which treated the CCP across the Taiwan Straits as a major concern.

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<sup>1</sup>The Wade-Giles system of romanization is used in this paper for terms in Chinese. This is the system commonly used in Taiwan. The Pinyin system, in contrast, is used in China. However, in some cases, persons' names are romanized in another system since the author wants to follow the spelling of the person's name that he or she used, even though it is not based upon the standard form.

<sup>2</sup>From the KMT point of view, the civil war formally ended in May 1991, when it announced the termination of the "Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion."

<sup>3</sup>In the KMT's view, *fa-tung* means "ruling the nation by means of the constitution". Halbeisen (1993) argues that the question of *fa-tung* was the central issue for debates on political reform in Taiwan after 1949.

The conflict between the ruling KMT regime, which relied on an abstract Chinese identity inherited from the mainland, and the competing opposition, which was based more or less on Taiwanese identity from within the island's "lived" territory, seemed inevitable. Huntington (1992) also points out that Taiwan is one of three countries in recent years whose national identity, defined by the ideology of the dominant founding party, has been seriously challenged by the opposition.<sup>4</sup> To date, he argues, this problem has been dealt with in two ways. First, the dissident party challenging the founding myth has been kept out of power. Second, the regime itself has pragmatically adjusted, in effect modified, or even abandoned, the founding myth in practice (Huntington, 1992: xii). The political developments in Taiwan more or less followed the second path described by Huntington: the KMT's definition of the state in terms of Chinese identity tended to recede into the background and to allow ways for Taiwanese identity to explicitly make its debut inside the KMT. The KMT, after adopting outright conquest, massacre, and de-politicization (i.e., to make people indifferent or inattentive to politics) to rule this island, gradually adapted to the development of Taiwan consciousness, which was the opposition's principle loci, by conducting various measures like symbolic recruitment, co-optation, localization or Taiwanization, and democratization, especially since a series of diplomatic setback in the 1970s.

This paper will deal mainly with the following empirical questions:

--- What were the dominant ideologies imposed by the KMT state to maintain its legitimacy? How could we explain the KMT's creation of China-centered ideology, which had its corresponding demonstration in discourses like "*fa-tung*" and "mainland recovery"?

--- What were the counter ideologies advocated by the opposition forces to mobilize its supporters at various stages? How could we explain the emergence of the idea that "Taiwan belongs to Taiwanese" in the circle of opposition forces?

--- In the 1990s, why and how did the KMT increasingly adapt itself to Taiwanese identity and begin the unprecedented process of democratization in Taiwan's history? Then, why and how did the opposition forces gradually become an institutionalized electoral party and adopt a more moderate, rather than a more radical, version of Taiwanese nationalism? How did the two strands of reflections on

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<sup>4</sup>The other two countries are Turkey and Mexico.

national identity dialectically affect the possible final forms of Taiwan's future status?

--- How could we explain the dynamic relationships between the state and the opposition forces in Taiwan? What is a better framework for dealing with the interaction of different ideologies imposed by the state and the opposition forces?

The focus of this study is on Taiwan, but this analysis will take place in the context of theoretical debates about the intrinsic nature of separatist nationalism. Before moving on to the empirical investigation, I will begin with a literature review of the different theories of separatist nationalism, i.e., primordialism, internal colonialism, and constructionism. I will then propose the framework adopted in this study which treats nationalism as an *interactive episodic discourse*.

### Theories of Separatist Nationalism<sup>5</sup>

At the time of writing, not a day passes without some report of action by separatist nationalists, be they Sikhs, Basques, Tamils, Kurds, the Baltic peoples --- or any of a host of others. The past twenty years, Hobsbawm (1992) says, have seen more genuinely illuminating works on nations and nationalism than the whole preceding century. Confronting the immense variety of historical and theoretical writings on nationalism, three approaches can be regarded as direct theories of separatist nationalism: ethnicity or primordialism, internal colonialism, and constructionism.<sup>6</sup> In these theories, separatist nationalism is either seen (1) as a reflection of "primordial attachment" in re-orienting pre-existing members of a specific collectivity, (2) as an indicator of organized contentions for existing "disadvantage or injustice", or (3) as the result of "manipulation" of ethnic sentiments by the leaders of different groups for political reasons.

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<sup>5</sup>The term "separatist" or "secessionist" nationalism may appear to recognize the legitimacy of the original official nationalism and to justify the status quo. However, this is not my intention here. It is noteworthy that even though the submerged nations or nations without a state frequently are labeled as having "separatist" or "secessionist" nationalism, they do not consider themselves in these terms. Therefore, the term "separatist nationalism" is adopted out of convenience.

<sup>6</sup>I have to acknowledge that it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare, let alone integrate, the fruitful and diversified literature on nations and nationalism. However, my rationale of classifying the relevant literature is based upon an appreciation of the status of separatist nationalism in the existing literature as relevant to this case study.

*Theory of Primordialism*

It is popularly assumed that nations exist first and that out of a nationalist struggle the nation wins a state. Nationalists argue that their nation has always existed, and that "the political and national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983: 1). Following this logic, primordialist scholars (e.g., Geertz, 1963<sup>7</sup>; Smith, 1986, 1991) often treat ethnicity as essentially "primordial given," meaning some underlying and fundamental set of ascriptive characteristics. Their fundamental tenet is that ethnicity --- ethnic identity or ethnic consciousness --- is the primary independent variable that leads to political assertiveness and militant separatism, regardless of the existence of inequality or dominance. In this sense, a nation, argues Smith, is a "named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith, 1991: 14).

In short, social and economic discrepancies *per se* create discontent and may incite revolution, but only discontent founded on ethnic symbols, such as language, religion, culture, origin or race lead to separatism. "Distinct communities prefer to be governed poorly by their ethnic brethren instead of wisely by aliens. The latter is worse than oppressive, it is degrading" (Heraclides, 1991: 8).

Inherent in this tendency to view separatist nationalism as a product of primordial attachment are several shortcomings. First, this approach has difficulty accounting for separatist struggles on the part of groups that can hardly be characterized as ethnic groups. For instance, separatist movements may be formed by groups sharing the same

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<sup>7</sup>Even though the work of Geertz (1963) could be seen as the representative of primordialism in the contending theories of nationalism, it is noteworthy that he later differs on the intrinsic nature of nationalism. In this later essay, Geertz (1973: 238-243) divides the historical development of nationalism into four major phases --- its initial formation, triumph, establishment of state, and redefinition of the relationship between different groups externally and internally. "The most obvious changes, those which caught and held the attention of the entire world, occurred in the second and third of these phases. But the bulk of the more far-reaching changes, those altering the general shape and direction of social evolution, occurred or are occurring in the less spectacular first and fourth" (Geertz, 1973: 238).

In other words, to Geertz (1973), rather than the political development in the second and third phases, the key components of nationalism remain the cultural evolution in the first and fourth phases. Therefore, the major task of "nation building" is not so much a political and military adventure followed by economic construction as a socio-historical and cultural building of the concept of "nation." In this sense, Geertz's position has gone beyond primordialism and could be treated as constructionism, which tends to see nationalism as a kind of cultural construction.

language and culture with those of the group in control of the center, as in the case of the American Confederacy. Second, the criteria used for identifying nation by scholars of this approach --- language, ethnicity or whatever --- are shifting and ambiguous. Finally and most seriously, there is a tendency to reify the concept of nationalism in this approach. Proponents of primordialism frequently imply that the idea of nation is an incontrovertible fact, a substantial entity, or even a natural given that does not merit further investigation. This perception overlooks the complexity of nation-related phenomena, especially the dimension of how the "concept" of nation is interpreted, constructed, and articulated. Thus, we must explore alternative explanations that go beyond the simple notion of ethnicity.

### *Theory of Internal Colonialism*

The internal colonialism thesis proposes a contrasting explanation for the emergence of separatist nationalism: economic inequality. According to Heraclides (1991: 7), the theory of economic inequality was originally alluded to by Marxists such as Lenin and Gramsci, and has more recently been taken up by students of Latin America, of the black ghettos of the United States, and of the Palestinians of Israel. It has been more thoroughly developed by Hechter (1975), who argues that states that are not integrated tend to split into two cultural groups: the core, that is the dominant cultural group, and the periphery, those territories largely occupied by the subordinate or peripheral cultural groups. When the division of labor is cultural and when there are economic inequalities between the cultural core and periphery, the deprived cultural group resists integration and tilts toward separatism.

Proponents of internal colonialism usually identify economic grievances fueled by underdevelopment and external control of economy, along with political oppression and cultural domination, as conditions in motivating separatist nationalism. While it can be claimed that separatism is due to cultural factors (i.e., the periphery is subordinated culturally), to political factors (i.e., the periphery is denied political power), or to some other dominance within the periphery, its basis remains economic injustice.

Despite notable contributions to the study of separatist nationalism, internal colonialism theorists' tendency to view nationalism as manifestations of economic inequality has several limitations. First, it is still doubtful whether the theory can predict and explain all, or even the majority of active separatist nationalist movements. And clearly many movements have their militant separatism grounded on the primordial attachment. Second, because



nationalism is seen as a product or even symptom of some "structural" factors in this approach, analytic attention is riveted on "discovering" the underlying structures that spawn separatist nationalism. Thus, nationalism as such has not been the central subject of empirical investigation. Finally, the thesis of internal colonialism tends to reduce complex phenomena to a single factor or process that produces separatist nationalism.

In the end, one could say that primordialism and internal colonialism are the two polar opposite models of disintegration within which separatist movements oscillate.

### *Theory of Constructionism*

Finally, another trend in much of the scholarly work emphasizes the peculiarly constructed and imagined quality of nations and nationalism. This "subjective" approach of nationalism appears in the writings of classical writers. For instance, Weber (1978) emphasizes the inter-subjective aspect of nationhood, observing that objective characteristics of community do not identify a nation, for the concept belongs in the "sphere of values." Often, however, identification with a nation or "national solidarity" is linked to memories of a common political destiny and common descent, either real or imagined. Renan (1990) also contends as early as 1882 that none of the conditions of common geography or territory, language, race or religion meet the critical test of being either necessary or sufficient for the existence of a nation. Rather, he argues, a nation consists of two integrated components, including a common possession of a rich heritage of memories in the past, and a desire to live together and pass on the heritage. He even furthers the following famous statement, "A nation's existence is ... a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life" (Renan, 1990: 19).

The idea that a nation is made by subjective elements is also evident in the writings of many contemporary scholars. Gellner (1983: 48-49) not only argues that struggle comes first and that out of struggle a nation may be created, but also contends that a nation must be composed of people who recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. He says,

...nations are the artifacts of men's conviction and loyalties and solidarities....It is their recognition of each other as fellows... which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes ...which separate that category from non-members (Gellner, 1983: 7).

The thesis clearly suggests that it is nationalism that invented nations, not the other way around, a motif that runs through the works of Breuilly (1982), Anderson (1991), Hobsbawm (1992) and Calhoun (1995). In addition to the emphasis on voluntaristic principles in the "making of nation," these scholars also assume that nationalism is a "modern" phenomenon. That is, the claim that there exists a group with a specific cultural identity and that, as a consequence, this group should possess a territorial state of its own, is a by-product of conditions prevailing in the modern world.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the task of any general theory of nationalism is to identify the key aspects of modernity to which one can relate nationalism.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the fact that the theory of constructionism demonstrates with much subtlety and originality that nation is neither natural nor eternal but a "modern historical construction," this approach possesses some limitations. First, the sets of arguments proposed by the proponents of constructionism clearly work better for some sorts of nationalism, especially those based on the Western experience, than for others, especially Third World nationalism. Second, this approach tells us little about why nationalism, rather than any other form of politics, is sought after as a remedy to social, cultural and economic problems in many areas of the world. Therefore, the theory of constructionism, I argue, is an unbalanced explanation, long on examining the complexity of causes, but short on making the connection between the causes and the result of nationalism.

### *Seeing Separatist Nationalism as an Interactive Episodic Discourse*

After reviewing these different approaches to separatist nationalism, it is time to put the scattered pieces into a more consistent framework, which I label as the "approach of interactive episodic discourse," for exploring the dynamics of Taiwanese nationalism. Partly sharing the perspective of constructionism, my proposed

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<sup>8</sup>It is the reason why Smith (1986: 7-13) labels proponents of this approach of nationalism as "modernists." Please also refer to the work of Calhoun (1998) in this volume.

<sup>9</sup>However, it is notable that different authors select different notions of what happens in the modern period and relate that to nationalism. For instance, in terms of the origin of nationalism, while Gellner's (1983) project begins with exploring changes in social structure (e.g., industrialization and the coincident role of culture in the construction of social identity), Anderson's (1991) focus is changes in social consciousness (e.g., the way print-capitalism shapes the pattern of communication and cultural understanding), and Breuilly's (1982) concern can be seen as changes in political structure or consciousness (e.g., the development of the modern "public" state).

framework is based on the following two assumptions that should be made explicit.

First, this study asserts that any study of nationalism in general, and separatist nationalism in specific, should use a *multi-dimensional* and *multi-causal* framework. Most the researchers of constructionism share this assumption, since none of them imagines that any "single-factor" explanation will work for analyzing the complex phenomenon of nationalism. A single line of causation, be it ethnic, economic or cultural, cannot adequately explain the outburst of nationalism. Breuilly captures the multi-dimensionality of nationalism clearly:

Nationalism cannot be linked to any particular type of cultural attribute or social arrangement; or to any particular structure of communication; or any particular class interest, or to any particular economic relationship, or to any particular psychological state or need, or to any particular social function or objective (Breuilly, 1982: 35-36). The second assumption of my framework is the *dynamic* interpretation of the concept "nation." Nation is not a static entity, rather it evolves over time, comes into being, rises and falls in the world-historical process. That is, instead of focusing on nations as real groups, we should focus on nationhood and nationness as a conceptual variable. We should also treat nation not as substance but as institutionalized form; not as entity but as contingent event. If the study of separatist nationalism is to advance beyond the point of simple description, a more exacting "dynamic" concept is needed.

In order to capture the multiple and dynamic qualities of separatist nationalism, I have proposed the framework *seeing the "making of nation" as a "crafting identity process" shaped by both socioeconomic and political developments, conceived and articulated in an emerging nationalist discourse*. This approach emphasizes the following three sets of arguments regarding separatist nationalism: treating nationalism as a kind of "discourse," pinpointing the reciprocal "interaction" between the state and the opposition force for generating the alternative nationalist discourse, and situating this specific discourse in the broader "episodic" context.

First, following the argument of constructionism, I would treat separatist nationalism as a kind of *ideology* or *discourse*. In adopting the concept "discourse" to describe the nature of nationalism, my intention is to reveal the intrinsic property of "being constructed" within every nationalist ideology. Therefore, the task of researchers in this approach becomes to uncover and, when possible, to dissolve contingent, historical constraints on nationalist thought. It is important to point out that the "true" retrieval and propagation of an actual event

is not at issue here. Rather, it is the process of *imagining* and *creation* of the memory, and the struggles associated with this process, that matters. This argument implies the acknowledgment of the "relative autonomy" of nationalist ideology itself in the process of competition between the different collective actors. It is part of the reason why "much of the early activity of nationalists has been focused not on directly contesting state power but on *efforts to reform culture*" (Calhoun, 1995: 268, emphasis added). However, even though recognizing the peculiarly constructed and imagined quality of the concept "nation," my framework does not imply that ideological or discursive formation itself can explain the outbreak, processes and outcome of the nationalist movement. Rather, it simply suggests that ideology is an important explanatory factor together with the political and socio-economic factors.

The second set of arguments concerns the significance of *reciprocal interaction* between different collective actors in the forming process of nationalist discourse. This argument rejects the treatment of nationalism as a mere system of ideas. Rather, nationalism is conceived as a *dynamic, ongoing social process* through which discourse is created and yet, at the same time, is subject to transformation by the willful actions of more or less knowledgeable actors. For instance, while Anderson (1991) argues that nationalism may even have originated in colonial experience (in other words, colonialism was a great source of nationalism),<sup>10</sup> he rightly emphasizes the weight of interaction between the colonized and the colonizer in generating the nationalist discourse.

Hennayake (1992) provides another example demonstrating the crucial role of interaction in explaining the origin of nationalism. In this case study of the Tamil ethnonationalism in Sri Lanka, Hennayake argues that the state could be seen as the major propagator, if not guardian, of the majority ethnonationalism, which in turn is seen as the major causal factor in the emergence of minority ethnonationalism. The majority nation and the state have developed a symbiotic relationship with a high degree of dependence on each other. Consequently, both have a stake in each other's survival and success. As the exclusionary tendency of majority ethnonationalism increases, and the majority nation increasingly defines the state in its own right, the consent that minority ethnic groups extend to the state is equally withdrawn. Under

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<sup>10</sup>Anderson (1991: 163-185) argues that the anti-colonial imagination, ironically, has its origin in the colonial state's classification of the colony's ethnic groups, territory, and history. The original goal of anti-colonialist nationalism, then, is to empower the nationality whose boundaries were drawn by the colonial state.

this circumstance, minority groups usually develop their own alternative ideology to fight against the majority ethnonationalism.

My third set of arguments is that the construction, maintenance and domination of a particular nationalist discourse must be understood within its *specific episodic context*. This context represents relatively stable conditions that favor or restrict the activities, including discursive formation, of the major political actors. However, this episodic context is not treated as a fixed entity into which the nationalist discourse emerges. Rather, the context itself is understood as being created, recreated, and changed by actors struggling in the universe of political discourse. Breuilly (1982: 383-384) argues that there is no natural basis to nationalism and that as a form of politics it arises only under certain political conditions. On the same point, Agnew (1989) also argues that nationalism is "... the political product of a particular set of circumstances that wax and wane in content and support as circumstances changed."

In sum, the concept of interactive episodic discourse between state and opposition forces is grounded in the following two assumptions: (1) treating nationalism as a multi-dimensional and multi-causal model; (2) regarding nationalism as a dynamic concept; and three sets of arguments: (1) seeing nationalism as discourse; (2) considering the role of interaction in explaining the emergence of separatist nationalism; (3) thinking about the broader episodic context.

### The Setting — Taiwan

The island of Taiwan, or Formosa, is sometimes compared in shape to a sweet potato or to a tobacco leaf, two of its major crops. Taiwan is located between the Philippines and Japan and lies 100 miles off the coast of China. At 14,000 square miles, it is roughly the size of the Netherlands or the U.S. state of West Virginia (Cohen, 1991: xii).

The history of Taiwan has been a history of colonial oppression. Originally populated by Malay-Polynesian indigenous groups, Taiwan has always been located at the intersection of other sphere of influence, including the Han Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Manchus, Japanese, or even American. Although the Han Chinese began migrating to Taiwan in the seventeenth century, it was the Spanish and Dutch, wanting to build a trading post in Asia, who introduced the state apparatus into Taiwan. Koxinga (Chêng Ch'êng-Kung) and his supporters expelled the Dutch in 1661 and used Taiwan as an anti-Manchu base until 1683. However, after consolidating its power in mainland China, the Manchus of the Ch'ing Dynasty gained control of Taiwan in 1683. Then the island was ceded to the Japanese in 1895 as

an outcome of the first Sino-Japanese War. It was not until the collapse of Japan in World War II in 1945 that Taiwan was ruled by the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-Shek. Soon afterward, civil war between the KMT and CCP broke out, and the KMT, defeated in 1949, fled the mainland and moved their government to Taiwan.<sup>11</sup>

Taiwan's population is usually divided into four ethnic groups.<sup>12</sup> The non-Han residents of several distinct groups, who are considered to be of Malay-Polynesian origin, are referred to collectively as aborigines (*Yüan-Chu-Min*). They comprise a bit more than one percent of the population. Then, "Taiwanese"<sup>13</sup> is the term used to denote only those Han Chinese who had already lived in Taiwan prior to the wave of migration that occurred at the end of the 1940s, and their offspring. Based upon their mother tongue, Taiwanese can further be categorized into two groups: Hoklo (*Hê-Lao-Jên*) and Hakka (*K'ê-Chia-Jên*). Together they comprise about slightly less than eighty-five percent of the population, with the former outnumbering the

<sup>11</sup>For the general description of Taiwan's history, see Su, 1980, 1986.

<sup>12</sup>A claim regarding the grouping of ethnic groups in Taiwan has political implications. Since we can find sub-groups within every so-called "ethnic group" (Mainlanders came from various parts of China; Aborigines have different cultural backgrounds; Hoklo and Hakka can also be further classified, based on their origin, into some sub-groups), any classification can be seen as "arbitrary" to some extent. My conventional classification is adapted from Cheng-Feng Shih's (1997: 1) rationale: first, we can distinguish people in Taiwan into non-Han residents and Han residents; then, we can further choose the timing of arriving in Taiwan (i.e., before or after 1945) as the second criteria to classify people; finally, we can use language as another criteria to categorize Taiwanese into Hoklo and Hakka.

	Came to Taiwan before 1945	Came to Taiwan after 1945
Non-Han residents	a	Not applicable
Han residents	b	d
	c	
	a: Aborigines c: Hakka	B: Hoklo d: Mainlander

<sup>13</sup>In Taiwan, especially within the elite circle, there is a new tendency to use the term "Taiwanese" to refer to all inhabitants of Taiwan, including members of every ethnic group, rather than members of Hoklo and Hakka only. This tendency signals the gradual formation of a new "we-group" consciousness based upon the territory of Taiwan, since every person residing in Taiwan is seen as Taiwanese. I am sympathetic with this new political connotation of the term "Taiwanese." However, to many ordinary people in Taiwan, "Taiwanese" still refers to Hoklo and Hakka only. Therefore, I adopt the term "Taiwanese" to describe Hoklo and Hakka only in this paper.

latter by two or three to one. The fourth group, "Mainlanders (*Wai-Shêng-Jên*)," refers to those who were born on the mainland China and came to Taiwan after 1945, though most came in 1949 to escape the CCP, and also their offspring. They comprise about fourteen percent of the population.<sup>14</sup>

### Setting the Agenda: The China-centered Ideology of the KMT State<sup>15</sup>

After their defeat and their loss of the Chinese mainland to the CCP in late 1949, the Nationalist government, the organs of the KMT party machine and about 600,000 soldiers and 640,000 civilians, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Taiwan. At this point, the "China question", or the question of the "representation of China's seat" in international politics, emerged. On the one hand, in the KMT's view, Taiwan became the location of the legitimate government of all of China, even though the KMT government in Taipei was limited to Taiwan, Penghu (the Pescadores) and a number of small islands off the coast of the Chinese mainland and in the South China Sea. The United States and most of the rest of the world acceded in this. On the other hand, the CCP's People's Republic of China (PRC) repeatedly tried to relegate the KMT to the dustbin of history and bring the unfinished civil war to an end (Domes, 1993: 118; Tsang, 1993a: 1-2).

The ideology of the KMT state in Taiwan is embodied in Article II of the KMT charter:

The Kuomintang shall be a revolutionary and democratic political party charged with the mission of completing the National Revolution, carrying out The Three Principles of the People, *recovering the Chinese mainland, promoting Chinese culture, aligning with other democratic nations, and building the Republic of China into a unified, free, peace-loving, and harmonious democracy based on the Three Principles of the People* (quoted from Wachman, 1994b: 24, emphasis added).

<sup>14</sup>For a comprehensive account of the ethnic assimilation and competition in Taiwan, refer to Wang (1989).

<sup>15</sup>Despite the rhetorical objection to Marxism-Leninism ideologically, the KMT could be seen as a Leninist-type party in some ways --- such as in its structure, its attempt to establish a party-state, its persuasiveness in society, and its functioning as an instrument of a kind of dictatorship. Especially since the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT under Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo penetrated virtually the entire social fabric in its attempt to create a kind of party-state in Taiwan (Chung-Hsien Huang, 1996; Juo-Lin, 1994: 91-101; Tsang, 1993b: 67). Thus, in my paper, "the KMT", "the KMT state", "the KMT regime", and "the Taiwan state" are used interchangeably.

The ideological foundation of the KMT state has been *The Three Principles of the People* (*San-Min Chu-I*). This ideology combines nationalism, democracy, and a form of democratic socialism.<sup>16</sup> To some degree, this ideology could be viewed as having merely rhetorical or symbolic meaning in support of the KMT's claim to legitimacy in representing China. After the retreat to Taiwan, facing the threat of China and the potential ethnic tensions between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, the KMT state adopted another "convenient" ideology for surviving rather than the official propaganda of *The Three Principles of the People*.<sup>17</sup> The basis was "China-centeredness," which had its corresponding demonstration in policies or discourses like "*fa-tung*" (constitutional continuity) and "mainland recovery." These discourses have manifested themselves in grand campaigns, symbolic gestures, as well as countless restrictions and requirements meant to embed these aims in the minds of Taiwan's population.

### *The Fa-Tung Discourse*

The discourse of *fa-tung* could be seen as the base of the KMT's rationale for its authoritarian rule in Taiwan. First, the KMT viewed itself as the only "legitimate government of all China" and viewed the CCP on the mainland as a rebel regime. Second, during the period of Communist insurgency, the KMT had "temporarily" retreated to the island of Taiwan. The KMT was the government of all China rather than simply the government of the island of Taiwan. Thus, dual-tier governmental structures were constructed: one for the "national government of China" in temporary exile on Taiwan; the other for the Taiwan "Province." Third, to maintain the "constitutional continuity", the KMT preserved the three national legislative bodies that were created by the constitution of 1946: the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan.

In other words, this discourse claimed that the KMT government is the only legitimate government of all China, that Taiwan is a Chinese province, and that the island should serve as the base for a recovery of the mainland. Based on these claims, these three legislative bodies were operated by members elected in 1947 on the mainland,

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<sup>16</sup>The essence of *The Three Principles of the People* can be found in a series of speeches given by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the KMT, at Canton, China, in 1924 (Wei, 1973: 18).

<sup>17</sup>There is a school of thought in Taiwan advocating that what the KMT did wrong in Taiwan was due to its deviation from *The Three Principles of the People*, which is seen as a potentially better doctrine than its present presentation in the KMT's official propaganda. My statement does not imply this kind of thought. I wish to thank H. C. Lin for calling my attention to this.



since the KMT could not hold elections on the mainland to replace them after their terms expired.<sup>18</sup> The KMT explained that if it had reconstituted these bodies by holding elections only in Taiwan, it would have become merely the government of Taiwan rather than the government of China (Tsang, 1993a: 5-6; Chu, 1994: 47-8).

The relevant phenomenon of the *fa-tung* discourse was the dominance of Mainlanders in political power in Taiwan. This dominance was evident in the following respects. First, in terms of the ethnic composition of the cabinet, prior to 1984, Taiwanese had only been allowed to fill the two less important positions in the eight cabinet seats under the premier: Ministers of Interior and Communication. The more powerful cabinet seats --- Defense, Economic Affairs, Finance, Education, Foreign Affairs, and Justice --- had traditionally been reserved for KMT affiliated Mainlanders (Wang, 1989: 190-191). In addition, the percentage of Taiwanese in the cabinet was low, even though Taiwanese constituted almost 85% of the population (see Table 1). Second, although Taiwanese accounted for the majority of the armed forces under the current conscription system, the proportion of Taiwanese decreased with military rank (see Table 2). Third, only about 15% of the congressional seats were filled by the elections held in Taiwan before 1991. As of 1987, 218 out of 316 (or 69%) active seats in the Legislative Yuan were controlled by the Mainlanders. The National Assembly had 92% Mainlanders (Wang, 1989: 191).

**Table 1: Ethnic Composition of the Taiwanese Cabinet, 1950 - 1993**

Year	Total N in Cabinet	Number Mainlander	Number Taiwanese	Percent Mainlander	Percent Taiwanese
1950	20	19	1	95.0%	5.0%
1954	19	18	1	94.7%	5.3%
1960	19	17	2	89.5%	10.5%
1963	24	22	2	91.7%	8.3%
1966	24	21	3	87.5%	12.5%
1972	23	17	6	74.0%	26.0%
1976	23	16	7	69.6%	30.4%
1978	20	14	6	70.0%	30.0%
1984	19	12	7	63.2%	36.8%
1993	36	22	14	61.2%	38.8%

Source: Adapted from Shu H. Huang (1995: 221).

<sup>18</sup>The political observers and members of opposition forces called these legislative bodies the "ten thousand year parliaments", which continued to exist until the end of 1991. However, the KMT claimed that the maintenance of these bodies was a symbol of so-called *fa-tung*.

Table 2: Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces  
in Taiwan, 1950 - 1988 (by percentage)

	Generals <sup>1</sup>		Colonels <sup>2</sup>		Lieutenants <sup>3</sup>		Soldiers <sup>4</sup>	
	ML	TW	ML	TW	ML	TW	ML	TW
1950-65	97.7	1.3	90.4	9.6	86.2	13.8	47.2	52.8
1965-78	92.6	7.4	81.2	18.8	65.3	34.7	31.6	68.4
1978-87	84.2	15.8	67.4	32.6	51.7	48.3	21.3	78.7

ML = Mainlander; TW=Taiwanese

- Note: 1. Includes generals, lieutenant generals, and major generals  
 2. Includes colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors  
 3. Includes captains, first lieutenants, and second lieutenants  
 4. Includes noncommissioned officers and soldiers

Source: Tien (1992: 42).

In addition to the political domain, the most important mechanism for creating the China-centered ideology and relevant *fa-tung* discourse would be the KMT's control of the major cultural apparatus: schools, universities, mass media, and even religious organizations. The KMT government advocated the value and importance of "being Chinese" as an equivalent of "being patriotic." Mandarin was taught as the official national language and the use of the Taiwanese languages<sup>19</sup> was restricted in the electronic media and forbidden in schools and on official occasions.<sup>20</sup> The practice of Taiwanese languages by ordinary citizens was discredited as "backward" or "un-patriotic" in government propaganda (Chang, 1993: 143-144). Furthermore, the KMT deprived Taiwanese of studying their own history, robbing Taiwanese of their collective memories.<sup>21</sup> Whatever little Taiwanese history was deemed worth mentioning in the textbook, it inevitably connected Taiwan to Chinese history. The KMT's official history has attributed Taiwan's "recovery" from Japan to the sacrifice of all Chinese during World War II. Taiwanese are thus carrying this "original sin," and they should gladly pay it back, by shouldering the burden of the entire Chinese government and the glorious task to "mainland recovery."

<sup>19</sup>Taiwanese languages at least include Hoklo, Hakka, and aboriginal languages.

<sup>20</sup>Murray and Hong (1991) provide an excellent review paper on the American anthropologists' image about Taiwanese culture. As a native Taiwanese, Hong describes his personal experience in Taiwan --- "Like Native Americans in reservation schools, I was punished for speaking my mother tongue when I went to school, and had to compete for higher education in the language of Beijing imposed by the mainland dictators, rather than in my mother tongue, Holo [my note: I spell as Hoklo in this paper], the language of more than four-fifths of the people on Taiwan (Murray and Hong, 1991: 273)."

<sup>21</sup>As Calhoun's (1995: 235) captivating argument shows, nationalism is rooted not only in historical memory and myth, illusions of great continuity, and glorification of martyrs and heroes. It is rooted also in the capacity *not to remember those events and processes* which would fester like scores and bring disunity.

*The Mainland Recovery Discourse*

Since there existed severe antagonisms between the KMT in Taiwan and the CCP in the mainland, the ideology of "*Fan-Kung Ta-Lu*" (literally, counterattack the mainland) or "mainland recovery" had become the specific political goal for the KMT in the early 1950s. The tensions between the two regimes was reflected in the dominant slogan of the period: "Three years of preparation, in the fourth reconquer the mainland" (Chu, 1994: 48).

There were two measures related to the discourse of mainland recovery: the policies of "emergency situation" and "anti-Communism." In terms of emergency situation policy, the KMT had continued to justify their position by saying that because they were constantly at war with the CCP they had to claim a state of siege,<sup>22</sup> maintain martial law,<sup>23</sup> and prohibit freedom of speech, the press, association, and the other basic human and political rights stipulated in the constitution. All other parochial interests had to be sacrificed in order to mobilize all forces for this overriding sacred mission of mainland recovery. In the terms of Antonio Gramsci (1971), the KMT constructed a "collective national-popular will" articulating what it determined was the dominant ideology. It did not tolerate heterodox challenges to this orthodoxy.

As for anti-Communist policy, the KMT opposed Marxism-Leninism vehemently. The KMT ideology in principle committed the party to introduce "democracy" to mainland China eventually. However, the KMT was ideologically self-contradictory due to the incompatibility of "emergency situation" claims and a "democracy" discourse. Chiang Kai-Shek's idea of the KMT's position, i.e., a "democratic revolutionary party", captures this contradiction:

Today, *our party is a democratic party* designed to promote constitutionalism. On the other hand, however, *our party is also a revolutionary party*, shouldering the responsibilities of struggling against the Communists, recovering the mainland, and saving life and freedom for our people. As a democratic party, our party should observe the norms of democracy and rule of law. As a revolutionary party, however, our party should strengthen the organization, maintain strict discipline, arouse revolutionary spirit, and accumulate revolutionary strength in order to stage a life-and-death struggle with Communist bandits. (quoted from Hsiao-Shih Chen, 1990: 136, emphasis added)

<sup>22</sup>This state of siege was proclaimed from 1947 to 1991.

<sup>23</sup>Martial law lasted for almost forty years from 1949 to 1987. This is surely one of the longest periods of martial law in human history.

Thus, while the goal of a "democratic revolutionary party" could be to achieve the end of democracy through the means of revolution, we may also view this democracy discourse as a rhetorical weapon for fighting against the ideology of Communism.

### **Contesting the Designation: The Ideologies of the Opposition and Its Interaction with the KMT**

Opposition politics do not arise out of nowhere or operate in a vacuum. They reflect historical legacies, policies of the ruling regime, or social structures caused by processes like state-making, the expansion of capitalism, industrialization, and modernization. Of the many controversies and conflicts between the opposition and the ruling regime in these processes, only a few crystallize as cleavage bases, of which even fewer salient ones can eventually be translated into constellations of opposition forces. "In Taiwan, the main cleavage tends to follow along the identity issue in which contention between Taiwanese versus Mainlanders ..... is the most salient (Tzu-Sung Chen, 1995: 67)."

Opposition forces under the KMT's authoritarian rule faced problems of political repression, human rights violations, and a highly uneven distribution of resource based on ethnicity. While these practical problems inspired the opposition discourses, the episodic context as well as the ideology of the state constrained discourse formation. The discourse of the Taiwanese opposition forces was formed in response to the KMT's package of discourses, especially the China-centered ideology. According to Moaddel (1992: 363), "the state's ideology broadly set the agenda for the opposition and defined its identity." Furthermore, "for the opposition, which aimed to transform the state, any ideology that was the ideology of the state was not right" (Moaddel, 1992: 363). Although the resulting opposition forces in Taiwan were heterogeneous, consisting of different ideologies with diverse backgrounds, interests, and political agendas, it appeared to be a single movement by virtue of its focus on a common enemy, the KMT party-state.

Since the episodic context is not a constant, and since the content or foci of discourses proposed by the opposition forces are also changing, I divide the development of opposition ideology into four different stages using the degree of radicalization as the point of demarcation. First, in the pre-1974 period, liberal democracy was the main ideology against the KMT state's authoritarian rule. Next, from 1975 to 1979, opposition forces emphasized both democratization and Taiwanization. Then, from 1980 to 1985, the call for self-determination

became the ideological weapon to rebut the KMT state's repression policy during this period. Finally, in the 1986 – 1990 period, the voice of Taiwanese nationalism emerged among the activists of the newly established opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party. As for the recent interaction between the KMT state and opposition forces in the 1990s, I will reserve this discussion for a separate section, since the domestic political landscape has undergone a fundamental change due to the emergence of CCP's new military threat.

### *Liberal Democratic Ideology: Pre-1974*

Before the mid-1970s, the opposition's ideological warehouse contained at least two variant positions, one based more or less on the Taiwan identity, and the other on an abstract idea of Western liberal democracy. The former, most of whom were overseas dissidents due to the severe state repression inside the island, did harbor quite a strong Taiwanese nationalism, though with its primitive form. However, the echoes of this movement in a distant soil, Japan or the US, could not extend its roots to the masses in Taiwan. The latter, mainly constituted by the liberal Mainlander elements on the island, had aimed its sharpened spear at the KMT's autocratic, undemocratic ways. Yet, opponents of the KMT regime inside the island at that time did not really take on the Taiwan identity issue as a rallying point, and they could be described as the opposition with Chinese identity. This ideological position itself did not readily gain sympathy in a society that was disproportionately Taiwanese in population.

The widening rift between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders was dramatically torn asunder in the February 28 Incident of 1947. On that date, a bitter and violent conflict between the Mainlander-led KMT government and Taiwanese ended in bloody suppression, claiming perhaps 10,000 to 20,000 Taiwanese lives.<sup>24</sup> The suppression of the February 28 Incident proved to Taiwanese the dictatorial nature of the KMT regime in Taiwan, a rule that was characterized by the oppression of one group of people, the Taiwanese, by another, the Mainlanders. However, with most Taiwanese elite being jailed or executed in the Incident, the opposition movement virtually devolved into the hands of a few surviving Taiwanese elite in exile or other overseas dissidents. These dissidents, who were affiliated with the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM),<sup>25</sup> did harbor quite a strong Taiwan identity.

<sup>24</sup>For detailed a description of the February 28 Incident, refer to Kerr (1992), Mendel (1970), and Peng (1972). The aforementioned authors adopt a sympathetic attitude toward the Taiwanese, or Taiwan Independence Movement. For the pro-KMT account of this Incident, refer to Lai et al. (1991).

<sup>25</sup>Compared to other subjects in the field of Taiwan studies, the Taiwan Independence Movement, especially its overseas component, is a relatively ignored research subject.

In 1955, Dr. Liao Wen-Yi and his associates set up the *Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa* in Japan, the chief intellectual and political center for overseas anti-KMT activities in the 1950s and 1960s. They started to think that "Taiwanese are not Chinese." "Who are we then?" The course of denying one's ancestry was unheard of in their tradition. It would not be easy to exorcise. Over time, different "theories" were proposed, ranging from Taiwanese as a mixed race, having a more modern and superior culture, to having a more advanced economy and living standards. Various political solutions were also discussed, including becoming part of Japan, becoming part of the US, or entrusting the island to the United Nations. Primitive Taiwanese nationalism was evolving during that period. One of its aspects was unmistakably anti-Mainlander.

Starting in the mid-1960s, the idea of Taiwan independence found some resonance among the Taiwanese students who went to study in North America. In 1970, the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) was formed in the United States.<sup>26</sup> In a more liberal environment, with the stimuli of the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War, Taiwanese encountered various liberal, or even radical, ideologies, including the "forbidden" Left ideology. Despite considerable efforts to spread their views on the island itself, only in the late 1970s did the question of Taiwan's identity become a topic of political debate among opposition circles in Taiwan.

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To my limited knowledge, Mendel's (1970) work is the only comprehensive account of this subject published in English, though the empirical data is not up-to-date. To date, Ch'ên's (1992) book is the best work on the topic, though with the limitation of journalistic style. There are also some other works by pro-KMT and pro-CCP authors (e.g., Martin, 1985; Chia-Shu Huang, 1994). However, they could only be treated as poor academic works at best, or official propaganda at worst.

<sup>26</sup>The US-based WUFI is an alliance of various overseas organizations advocating Taiwan independence. The merger includes the two largest groups, the Japan-based Taiwan Youth Association and the US-based United Formosans in America for Independence (UFAI) (Cohen, 1991: 289 - 90). Most of the participants were exiled because of the KMT's policy of blacklisting, i.e., the denial of their visas to go back to Taiwan.

Table 3: Significant Events Relevant for the KMT State and Opposition, 1945 - 1990

THE KMT STATE	OPPOSITION FORCES
Stage 1: Pre-1974	
'45: KMT took over Taiwan after the Japanese surrender.	
	'47: There were about 10,000 - 20,000 Taiwanese killed by the KMT in a popular unrest called "February 28 Incident."
'49: KMT was defeated by CCP and fled to Taiwan.	'49: <i>Free China Fortnightly</i> was founded
	'55: Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa was established in Japan by Dr. Liao Wen-Yi.
	'60: Lei Chên affair (i.e., the failure of forming Chinese Democratic Party) and the emergence of independent politicians.
	'70: World United Formosans for Independence was formed in the United States.
'71: ROC was expelled from the UN.	
'72: Chiang Ching-Kuo became premier.	
Stage 2: 1975 - 1979	
'75: Chiang Kai-Shek died, Chiang Ching-Kuo became the chairman of the KMT.	'75: The <i>Taiwan Political Review</i> was published.
	'77: The Taiwan Presbyterian Church declared that "Taiwan was a new and independent nation."
'79: US de-recognized ROC.	'79: <i>Mei-Li-Dao (Formosa) Magazine</i> was released; The Kaohsiung Incident happened and most of the opposition leaders were arrested after this incident.
Stage 3: 1980 - 1985	
	'83: The <i>Tang-Wai</i> released the campaign slogan "Democracy, Self-determination, and Saving Taiwan".
	'84: The debate on "Taiwanese consciousness" emerged.
Stage 4: 1986 - 1990	
	'86: The formation of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
'87: Martial law was terminated; the ban restricting Mainlander veterans from visiting their homeland in mainland China was removed.	
'88: Chiang Ching-Kuo died, vice-president Lee Teng-Hui succeeded as president.	
	'90: The DPP formed the Taiwan Independent Sovereignty Movement Committee to advocate Taiwan's independence.

Data: Guying Chen (1982: 34), Copper (1993: xiii-xxx), Gold (1986: 112), and Tsang (1993b: 48).

Source: Made by Author

In addition to the voice of Taiwanese nationalism advocated by overseas dissidents, between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, liberal democracy was the main discourse proposed by the opposition forces inside the island. At that time, two principal opposition groups prepared for competition with the KMT regime. These comprised a number of non-partisan intellectuals from the mainland on the one hand, and large parts of the Taiwanese urban upper class on the other. Under the leadership of Hu Shih, an eminent intellectual leader, these groups published a journal called *Free China Fortnightly* (Tz-Yu Chung-Kuo).<sup>27</sup>

Originally, KMT authorities not only allowed the publication of *Free China Fortnightly*, but also provided financial support and office supplies to this magazine. On the one hand, the rationale of the KMT's supportive attitude to the magazine could have been to improve the KMT's international image and gain U.S. support,<sup>28</sup> since the KMT claimed that it belonged to the "liberal world" led by the U.S.. On the other hand, the KMT also wanted to isolate the CCP and to advocate anti-Communism ideology by allying with the liberal democrats.

Gradually, the views expressed in *Free China Fortnightly* transformed from a critique of Communism adopted by the CCP to a critique of the internal affairs conducted by the KMT. Opposition writers began to draw up a balance-sheet of the political conditions in Taiwan, of the chances for a re-conquest of the Mainland, and of the global situation. A detailed critique of the KMT's policies in all important policy areas followed. In 1959, the journal's publishers began to prepare for the establishment of a new opposition party based on the ideology of liberal democracy, under the name "Chinese Democratic Party." However, the KMT thwarted this attempt in 1960 by arresting one of the prospective opposition party leaders, Lei Chên, and sentencing him to a long prison term under martial law.

According to Halbeisen (1993: 78), although the intellectuals related to *Free China Fortnightly* castigated the growing paralysis of political life as a consequence of maintaining the *fa-tung*, they did not question the Chinese identity of the political order. However, the arrest of Lei and the prohibition against the Chinese Democratic Party abruptly ended the first and only chance to bring the Taiwanese and

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<sup>27</sup>The description about *Free China Fortnightly* in this paper is based upon Domes (1993: 120), Lei (1978), Li (1987: 59), and Yao (1993).

<sup>28</sup>U.S. aid played a very significant role in Taiwan's post-war development. Jacoby (1966: 38) estimates that between 1951 and 1965, U.S. economic aid on average accounted for about 34 percent of total gross investment in Taiwan's economy.



Mainlanders together constructively to prevent the seemingly inevitable Taiwanization of the anti-KMT forces in the future.<sup>29</sup> From then on, in the 1960s and early 1970s, rigid party control and severe crackdowns on opposition groups characterized the authoritarian political climate in Taiwan.

The KMT's discourse for fighting against the opposition forces should be stressed. As the previous section shows, the KMT's discourses at this stage included the "China-centered" philosophy and "emergency situation" claim. Saying that they were constantly at war with the CCP, the KMT reminded the Taiwanese people of their experiences of defeat by the CCP and the possibility of CCP's invading Taiwan. This position was strengthened by the episodic context when the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis emerged in 1958.<sup>30</sup> Under this atmosphere, "propagandizing for the Communists" or "conducting sedition" became the most convenient charge against the democrats, as in Lei's case.

#### *Democratization and Taiwanization: 1975 - 1978*

The changing political atmosphere of the early 1970s, mainly caused by the crisis of international de-recognition and the pressure of a new Taiwanese middle class, provided opportunities for critical voices of the opposition forces. Eventually known as the *Tang-Wai*<sup>31</sup> movement, this loose coalition formed the first real challenge to the KMT's power monopoly. Essentially, along with the basic line of liberal democracy proposed by the group of *Free China Fortnightly* in the 1950s, the central concerns of *Tang-Wai* in the 1970s revolved around the question of "democratization" in its broadest sense. Furthermore, the unequal distribution of political power based on ethnicity, i.e., the Mainlander's political domination of the KMT, also caused the discourse of "Taiwanization", which called for more political participation for the Taiwanese. Thus, democratization and Taiwanization became two major discourses advocated by the opposition forces.

<sup>29</sup>For more information about the Lei Chên Affair's impact on the political landscape in Taiwan, see Ch'eng-Shê (1992).

<sup>30</sup>On 23 August 1958, the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis began while forces of the CCP fired on Quemoy, a small island off the coast of China. In 1949, the CCP forces failed to defeat the KMT armies there and left the island of Quemoy in the KMT's hands (Copper, 1993: xvi, 92).

<sup>31</sup>Due to the prohibition on the freedom to establish new political parties under martial law, there was no way for the opposition forces to form a political party. Thus, they labeled themselves as personages "outside the party" (KMT). In Chinese, *Tang* means "party", *Wai* means "outside".

In mid-1975, some activists of *Tang-Wai* started publishing a new political journal, the *T'ai-Wan Chêng-Lun* (*Taiwan Political Review*), which could be seen as the beginning of a new stage of opposition ideology. In addition to liberal democracy, the new opposition forces also advocated the necessity of Taiwanization. The first issue of the *Review* appeared in August, sold tens of thousands of copies overnight, and created a political storm on this generally politically docile island state. The articles in the *Review* went further than *Free China* in asking for extensive political reform and Taiwanization of the national political system. Even though the KMT closed down the fifth issue of the journal in 1975 and charged Huang Hua, the deputy editor of the *Review*, with sedition, the *Tang-Wai* forces still experienced a first breakthrough in the local and provincial elections of Autumn 1977 (Chiou, 1986: 20-21; Domes, 1993: 123). In this atmosphere, a severe ideological confrontation emerged between the newly formed opposition forces and the KMT state, especially focusing on the question of the representation of the population of Taiwan in the national legislative bodies.

The KMT regime had difficulties convincing its people to continuously support the goal of recovering the mainland. It became very difficult for people to take the goal seriously after almost twenty years of no military action. The KMT state for the first time since 1950 faced a potential challenge to its legitimacy from inside. Since most political arrangements in Taiwan were built upon the ideology of "China-centeredness," a challenge to such a national priority inevitably resulted in a chain reaction questioning the legitimacy of the status quo. Thus, more people began to seriously challenge the KMT's "China-centered" ideology, i.e., Taiwan is but one province of China, therefore its own people can have but ten percent of the national seats allocated to Taiwan in the "national" legislative bodies. The *Tang-Wai* asked for the total renewal of the national legislative body. Thus, the discourse of Taiwanization emerged.

Then, the KMT's "mainland recovery" ideology and accompanying "emergency situation" claim also became a kind of myth, since the people in Taiwan had witnessed the separation between mainland China and Taiwan for almost twenty years. The *Tang-Wai* asked for the abolition of martial law and emergency status based on the voice of democratization. The "National Affairs Conference of Personalities of the *Tang-Wai*" in 1978 put forth the following five categories of demands:

- the release of all political prisoners;
- the freedom to establish new political parties;
- the abolition of press censorship;
- the total renewal of the central legislative bodies;
- the popular election of the Governor of Taiwan and the Mayor of Taipei (quoted from Domes, 1993: 123).

Furthermore, political development at the international level also put Taiwan in an unfavorable spot. In 1971, Taiwan was forced to give up its seats in the United Nations to the PRC (Lasater, 1984: 10). This event was deemed the first major crisis for the KMT regime by the government as well as by the general population since its retreat to Taiwan. In 1979, the US de-recognized the KMT's Republic of China and established diplomatic ties with CCP's People's Republic of China (Copper, 1993: xx).

These diplomatic setbacks represented massive disturbances to the credibility of the KMT regime that had boasted at home and announced abroad that it was the sole legitimate government of China. In response, the opposition saw these slights as additional indications that the legitimacy of the KMT was waning. If the KMT could not hold the status of China in the eyes of the world community, there was no reason to place credence in the justification offered by the KMT for its continued domination of Taiwan (Wachman, 1994a: 135). The first issue of *Mei-Li-Dao (Formosa)*, the most important opposition magazine after the ban on *Taiwan Political Review*, evidenced the *Tang-Wai's* perspective on these diplomatic setbacks:

History will mark this a key year in determining our future and fate. The unstable international situation, the behind the scenes political turmoil in Taiwan, and pervasive social change, compel us to decide our future direction before the coming of a new era. History is putting us to the test.

America's break in formal relations with Taiwan announced with the complete bankruptcy of the KMT's foreign diplomacy. The KMT government now faces their greatest political crisis in thirty years. . . (quoted from Thomas, 1980: 12).

Even though the KMT faced diplomatic difficulties relevant to its China-centered ideology, the *Tang-Wai* still lacked an adequate ideological framework with which to articulate these diplomatic setbacks at this stage. Wang (1994: 13) argues that for the *Tang-Wai* leaders, these international crises served as catalysts for the possibility of challenging the KMT's dominant ideology rather than the feasibility of constructing the *Tang-Wai's* own comprehensive alternative ideology.

Overall, the ideologies and relevant discourses promoted by the opposition forces at this stage, i.e., democratization and Taiwanization, shared the following characteristics. First, the opposition forces moved from *Free China's* position in which political reform was seen as an abstraction expressed in terms of "moral principles", to the *Tang-Wai's* advocacy of "specific reforms" like the renewal of the national legislative bodies. Second, the benefit of the island of "Taiwan" itself and the welfare of its residents became the focus of political debate, rather than "mainland China" and the future of all Chinese people. Wachman contends that "this was a period --- perhaps the first --- when the immediate and tangible problems of Taiwan and the people who resided there, rather than the elusive ideological ambition to reunite China, came to the fore" (1994a: 137).

We could conclude that although the discourses espoused by the *Tang-Wai* did not foreclose the possibility of pursuing Taiwanese nationalism, that was not the primary focus at that stage. The discourse of Taiwanization was based on the concept of seeing Taiwanese as an "ethnic group", in contrast to Mainlanders, rather than a "nation", in contrast to Chinese. Their demand was focused on the inequality or disadvantage based on ethnicity. They asked the KMT regime to provide more political opportunity for the native Taiwanese, who constituted over eighty five percent of the population of Taiwan. They proposed to change the arrangement of the monopoly of political power by the KMT which, in turn, was overwhelmingly controlled by Mainlanders.

In response to *Tang-Wai's* demand for democratization and Taiwanization, the KMT played two cards to fight against the opposition forces at the same time. On the one hand, Chiang Ching-Kuo<sup>32</sup> also began to conduct a "Taiwanization" policy (or *Pên-T'u-Hua*). More Taiwanese elites were *selectively* incorporated into the KMT ruling stratum, and people were given opportunity to elect representatives of national legislative bodies to "supplement" the aging, life-long representatives who were originally elected on the mainland.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, the KMT tried to repress the voices of the *Tang-Wai*, accusing them of "disunifying the solidarity between Taiwanese

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<sup>32</sup>Chiang Ching-Kuo, the eldest son of Chiang Kai-Shek, was appointed premier of the Executive Yuan in 1972. After the death of his father in 1975, he took over the leadership of the KMT as the Chairman of the Central Committee. He finally assumed the Presidency of Taiwan in 1978 (Domes, 1993: 121).

<sup>33</sup>In 1969, in the first by-elections for the national legislative bodies to be held on the island since 1948, 15 new members of the Legislative Yuan were elected. In 1972, the number of delegates newly elected in Taiwan to the National Assembly increased to 53 out of 1,411, or 3.8%. In the same year, 51 new members were elected to the Legislative Yuan, a share of 12.6% of that body at that time (Domes, 1993: 122).

and Mainlanders", and encouraged right wing organizations --- which promoted anti-Communism ideology and were sponsored by the KMT to some degree --- to adopt extreme strategies, including violent confrontation, to fight against the *Tang-Wai* activists (Wang, 1994: 15).

On World Human Rights Day, December 10, 1979, a large *Tang-Wai* demonstration turned into a violent confrontation with the KMT authorities in Kaohsiung (Thomas, 1980). The KMT decided to repress the rapid growth of the organized opposition forces by arresting most of the leaders of the *Tang-Wai* movement. The KMT's repression contributed inadvertently to the radicalization of the *Tang-Wai*, both ideologically and strategically, by denying the nascent opposition a legitimate way to express its grievances. The KMT's oppression ultimately ended up strengthening, rather than weakening, the opposition forces. After the Kaohsiung Incident, the development of the opposition forces entered a new era.

#### *Taiwanese Consciousness and Self-Determination: 1979 - 1985*

What followed the Kaohsiung Incident and the end of the previous stage of intellectual ferment was a period of relative suppression that afforded no opportunity for vocal expression of dissident views. At that time, the totally demoralized *Tang-Wai* immediately faced the rescheduled national elections later in 1980. Miraculously the gloom and despair disappeared quickly once the campaigns were underway. Many "survivors" of the *Tang-Wai* movement, including relatives and defense lawyers of the imprisoned members of the *Tang-Wai*, grouped together quickly and created quite a political phenomenon throughout the island. The campaign attracted grass-roots support and rejuvenated the *Tang-Wai* mass movement (Chiou, 1986: 22). The KMT may have hoped that by jailing the *Tang-Wai* leadership they would decapitate the opposition. Instead, the *Tang-Wai* movement turned out rather like an earthworm. Wachman (1994a: 141) describes that "once beheaded, the body sprouted a new head, as a second generation of opposition leaders emerged to fill the roles of the senior leaders who had been jailed."

The political alienation caused by the Kaohsiung Incident made the *Tang-Wai* increasingly regard the KMT as "the enemy of the people" who would maintain their authoritarian rule by any means and would never allow meaningful democracy, political opposition, and political participation to develop and grow. Under these circumstances, among some groups within the *Tang-Wai*, the conviction spread that the problem of political order was intrinsically linked to the question of "identity", a position that found an increasing number of adherents in

the early 1980s. The statement by the Taiwan Presbyterian Church<sup>34</sup> that "Taiwan was a new and independent nation",<sup>35</sup> was followed several years later by a flood of publications trying to prove anthropological and cultural differences between Taiwan and mainland China. The debate on the existence of a separate "Taiwanese consciousness (*T'ai-Wan I-Shih*)," which began in 1984, provided the arguments needed to challenge the concept that Taiwan was part of China. Corresponding demands emerged for self-determination, that the inhabitants of Taiwan should decide the island's political status and its relation to China (Halbeisen, 1991; Min-Hui Shih, 1985).

In comparing the elections after the Kaohsiung Incident (e.g., 1980 and 1983) with the elections before the Kaohsiung Incident (e.g., 1977 and 1978), it is clear that the 1980 and 1983 elections began to show increasing alienation from and animosity toward the KMT along with increasing Taiwanization of *Tang-Wai* politics. In the supplemental election of 1983, the *Tang-Wai* adopted a formal platform calling for self-determination; the lifting of martial law and the full implementation of the constitution; a general election for national legislative bodies; separation of the KMT and the national government; and the release of political prisoners. Furthermore, the campaign slogan "Democracy, Self-determination, and Save Taiwan" emerged within the *Tang-Wai* circle. When the KMT banned the use of "self-determination" in *Tang-Wai* campaign literature, several candidates defiantly issued leaflets with the character for either "self" or "determination" and a black spot (Cohen, 1991: 46). In the 1985 election, the "self-determination" was also adopted as the priority within the formal platform.<sup>36</sup>

The *Tang-Wai* usually explained the meaning of self-determination as "the future of Taiwan should be decided by the residents of Taiwan." To some degree, "self-determination" could be seen as a synonym for "Taiwan Independence" or a transformation of the voice of "Taiwanese nationalism", even though the term has been interpreted differently by different groups within the *Tang-Wai*. At that time, facing the KMT's severe repression of the issue of Taiwan Independence, including charges of sedition leveled at proponents of

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<sup>34</sup>The Presbyterian Church had not only a solid place in native Taiwanese society going back to the conversion of modernizing elite by British missionaries in the 1890s, but also many decades of missions among the exploited aboriginal people (Arrigo, 1994: 160).

<sup>35</sup>Declaration of Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 16 August 1977. Refer to Cohen (1991: 389).

<sup>36</sup>For a detailed account of the platform, refer to Wang (1994: Appendix 2).

Taiwan Independence and a media campaign to link activists of Taiwan Independence with Communism, the *Tang-Wai* compromised and adopted self-determination instead of Taiwan independence as their main discourse.

Comparing with the demand for Taiwanization and democratization at a previous stage, Wang (1994: 19) contends that the emergence of self-determination as a dominant ideology within the *Tang-Wai* circle could be explained as the beginning of quasi-nationalism. The self-determination discourse has challenged the KMT's fundamental assumption of the ideology of China-centeredness, i.e., Taiwan is a part of China. Since the KMT still adopted repression to counterattack the demand for democratization and used the China-centered ideology to reject the demand for resource redistribution based on ethnicity, the *Tang-Wai* activists gradually also transformed their demand for equality and greater representation based on ethnicity to the discourse of establishing a new "nation-state".

Finally, the KMT's response to the radicalization of *Tang-Wai* ideology should also be stressed. Whether the KMT actually believed it or not, official propaganda about the *Tang-Wai* at this stage described it as a "three-in-one" enemy comprised of Communists, hoodlums, and advocates of Taiwan independence. This appeal may have caught the attention of the Mainlander criminal underworld, especially the *Bamboo Union Gang* (*Chu-Lien-Pang*) which began in the 1950s as an organization of Mainlander juvenile delinquents. In the aftermath of the 1980 elections, this gang of second-generation Mainlanders, reputed to have close ties to the KMT, became concerned with the burgeoning independence movement and what ramifications it had for the future of Taiwan (Wachman, 1994a: 141-142).

#### *Taiwanese Nationalism, 1986 - 1990*

Even though the KMT had adopted repression against the opposition forces in the previous stage, international trends outside Taiwan had shifted from dictatorship to democracy in the mid-1980s, especially in such nearby countries as the Philippines and South Korea. In the Philippines, the success of a popular movement resulted in the overthrow of a long-sitting dictator. In South Korea, massive demonstrations also provided lessons for the rulers and opposition in Taiwan (Gold, 1993: 180).

Under these circumstances, Taiwan's citizens began to take more initiative in social and political affairs. Although these figures are not further disaggregated, there has been an explosion in the number of civic organizations in Taiwan. These numbered 2,560, with a membership of 1.3 million people, in 1952 and increased to 13,766 in

1990, with a membership of 10.9 million individuals and 241,964 groups (Gold, 1993: 179). Of course, many of these are established and run by the KMT, but increasingly, especially with the passage of the Civic Organization Law in 1989, they are autonomous. This indicates the dramatic expansion of civil society in this one-party authoritarian corporatist society.

Since the state-society relationship has changed to some degree, four important steps toward liberalization were taken in 1986 and 1987 by the KMT. The first was the KMT authority's tolerance of formation of a formal opposition party in defiance of martial law. The second was the lifting of the martial law decree which has been in effect for almost thirty-seven years, and which constituted the formal and legal basis for military intervention in civilian affairs as well as human rights violations. The third was the removal of the ban restricting Mainlander veterans from visiting their homeland in mainland China. This implies the giving up of the goal to "reconquer the mainland" made by KMT leaders. This change also complicated Taiwan's domestic political development by increasing Taiwan-China contacts. The fourth step concerned freedom of expression --- the lifting of a ban on publishing new newspapers and the softening of censorship rules imposed by the Garrison Command (Chang, 1994: 126-127).

In terms of the development of the opposition forces, on the eve of the 1986 elections, the *Tang-Wai* leaders declared the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Since this did not elicit a repressive response from the government, the 1986 election turned out to be the first electoral campaign in post-1949 Taiwan in which political dissidents were able to participate as a political party. After the establishment of DPP, the radical element in the DPP has promoted "Taiwan Independence". As soon as the DPP was set up in 1986, an internal poll was conducted to see how many party members agreed with incorporating Taiwan independence into the party platform., with 60% in support. November 1990, DPP radicals pushed the independence issue further by forming a Taiwan Independent Sovereignty Movement Committee to advocate Taiwan's independence. In October 1991, they wrote the policy into their party's platform. The DPP adopted the name of the *Republic of Taiwan* for the 1991 National Assembly election campaign (Chu, 1994: 53-54).

Corresponding with the call for establishment of the Republic of Taiwan in the political domain, during this era, some of the intellectuals engaged in a project to invent a Taiwanese history and nationalist ideology that directly contradicts the claims of the KMT's Chinese nationalist ideology in the cultural realm. The Taiwanese nationalists, in both the political and cultural circles, have come to realize the need for a strong ideological basis; first, to legitimize their proposal to



establish the "Republic of Taiwan" and, second, to win Taiwanese mass support. This perhaps they have learned by observing the KMT's Chinese nationalist politics.

It is notable that the KMT also shifted its rhetorical discourse to counterattack the ideology of Taiwanese nationalism promoted by the DPP. At this stage, the KMT argued that democracy would enable Taiwanese activists to push for Taiwan independence, and that, in turn, would invite a military response from mainland China. Whether the KMT sincerely believed in the possibility of an attack by the PRC or whether it is the residue of an earlier ideological creed remains to be investigated more thoroughly. However, the KMT was eager to explain the equation: Democracy + Taiwan identity = Taiwan Independence + Chinese Communist Policy = PRC Attack on Taiwan. To some degree, the discourse of "China's attack on Taiwan" could be seen as an invention of this stage, especially compared with the discourse of "three-in-one enemy" of the previous stage.

### **Taiwan First: The Convergence of Ideologies in the 1990s**

The domestic political landscape in Taiwan has undergone a fundamental change in the 1990s. Broad consensus appears to have emerged in Taiwan that the current status quo --- the island's *de facto* independence --- is the baseline condition for any debate about Taiwan's status. On the one hand, while compared with the "old" KMT in the Chiang's era, the KMT under President Lee Teng-Hui has transformed to sink its political roots into Taiwan more deeply. The deepening of the KMT's Taiwanization and of Taiwan's democratization substantiates this transformation.

On the other hand, the DPP, which has competed quite successfully in the electoral arena, is also redefining its quasi-revolutionary political movement into an institutionalized electoral party. The tangible prospect of becoming a ruling party makes the DPP think twice about its long-held, deep-seated ideal of Taiwan independence, because China vows to use force to invade Taiwan at the time when Taiwan declares independence. Therefore, the recent trend is that the KMT and the DPP converge on the stance of "Taiwan First," with the former harboring the remote possibility of reunification and the latter tilting toward the probable independence of Taiwan. This tendency towards convergence of originally different, if not excluding, ideologies imposed by the KMT and the DPP deserves more serious attention.

### *A New KMT: Official Claims and Flexible Policies*

Since January 1988, a new era in Taiwan's political development has arisen with the death of President Chiang Ching-Kuo and the takeover by Lee Teng-Hui, a native Taiwanese with a Ph.D. in agricultural economics from Cornell University. When he succeeded Chiang as the president, Li was confronted with challenges from two sides: (1) real and potential resistance from conservative Mainlander elite within the old KMT to the ongoing democratic reform, and (2) the mounting popular pressure for democratization and Taiwanization coming from outside the ruling party, especially that from the DPP. Therefore, in formulating a position on Taiwan's international status, Lee had to stake out middle ground between the old KMT's Chinese nationalism and the emerging DPP's Taiwanese nationalism. This "new" KMT gradually retreated from its old claims in practice while simultaneously attempting to preserve the official version of the claim for deterrence purposes. However, facing pressure from a significant minority like the Mainlanders,<sup>37</sup> leaders of this new KMT still had to sooth Mainlanders' anxiety about Taiwan independence by assuring the final reunification of the whole of China. Thus Taiwan retained the name "Republic of China," and "reunification" was still a subject of official discourse. On February 22, 1988, Lee said,

The national policy of the *Republic of China*, everybody has to understand, is the policy emphasizing that there is only one China rather than two Chinas. *There is only one China and we want reunification* (quoted from T'ao, 1998; emphasis added).

It is really difficult to find any difference between the old KMT's reunification project and the above quotation expressed by Lee. In February 1991, the KMT under Lee also issued the "Guideline for National Unification" --- the highest principle for Taiwan's China policy. The Guideline proclaimed that Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China and that unification is the responsibility of every Chinese. Thus,

After an appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation, and consultation conducted on the principles of reason, peace, equity, and reciprocity, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should foster a consensus of democracy, freedom, and equal prosperity, and together build a single, unified China (quoted from Kao, 1992: 28).

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<sup>37</sup>From every perspective, Mainlanders were in fact a rather powerful minority group. On the eve of Lee Teng-Hui's presidency, Mainlanders controlled not only the key coercive state apparatus, the military, but also a substantial portion of ideological apparatuses and civilian media. The existence of a "significant minority," who were likely to perceive any drastic political change as ethnic collective disenfranchisement, posed a real problem for Taiwan's domestic stability.

Table 4: Significant Events Related to the  
Development of Taiwanese Nationalism in the 1990s

Time	Actor(s)	Event
02/91	KMT	The KMT proposed the "Guideline for National Unification."
10/91	DPP	The DPP passed the "Taiwan Independence Clause."
05/91	KMT	The KMT announced the end of the "Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion," formally ending the state of war with China.
12/91	DPP	The DPP failed in the National Assembly election.
05/92	KMT	Lee Teng-Hui expressed that "the Republic of China on Taiwan is a sovereign country."
12/92	DPP	The Legislative election showed a dramatic rebound of DPP's political strength because it stepped back from the extreme position of Taiwan independence.
08/93	KMT	Some KMT members who harbored a relatively assertive China identity decided to form the Chinese New Party.
12/94	DPP	Chen Shui-Pien, the DPP candidate for Taipei mayor, reversed his old pattern for Taiwan independence and won the election.
06/95	KMT	Lee Teng-Hui broke China's blockage to visit his Alma Mater, Cornell University, in the US.
07/95 - 08/95	China	China launched a series of missile tests and military exercises around Taiwan by showing the military threat to the Taiwanese people.
03/96	China	China launched another round of missile test and military exercise around Taiwan again for planning to lower Li Teng-Hui's votes in the coming presidential election.
03/96	KMT	Lee Teng-Hui won the Presidential election and ended up with a 54% majority vote.
11/96	DPP	The radical forces within the Taiwan Independence Movement felt the DPP's betrayal of the goal of Taiwan independence and formed the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP).

Data: Cheng(1995: 202), Tzu-Sung Cheng (1995: 156-157), Copper (1993: xxxii, xxx), Juo-Lin (1995: 244), and Lin (1996: 87-91).

Source: Made by Author

However, the Guideline insisted that the timing and method of unification must respect and consider the well-being of the people of Taiwan. Essentially, the KMT's position was that any talks between the two sides must be "conducted on the principles of reason, peace, equity, and reciprocity," i.e., any talks must be held at a government-to-government level. In this sense, the Guideline really put forward radical new proposals whereby Taiwan and China might recognize each other as separate political entities. We could interpret Lee's proposal as the launching of a diplomatic offensive. The Guideline put the Chinese leadership and the world on notice that Taiwan intended to promote China's national unification, but according to its own timing, manner, and terms.

In spite of public proclamations regarding the old *official claims*, the new KMT's policy in reality has not been cast in stone. President Lee, since he came to power, also advanced *flexible policies* to seek coexistence with China, as implied in the "Guideline for National Unification," and forsook the *fa-tung* from the mainland as a legitimate basis for the electorate in Taiwan. Then he shrewdly reshuffled the once Mainlander-dominated party, government, and military-security organizations and enthusiastically endorsed several unprecedented democratic reforms<sup>38</sup> to concurrently consolidate his power as well as put a Taiwanization program in action. However, the program of Taiwanization and its highly relevant democratization project, which proceeded at full throttle under Lee's leadership, has had serious backlash effects on the KMT's internal integration. The most dramatic event was the formation of the Chinese New Party (NP), which was established by a few alienated KMT members, most of them second-generation Mainlanders who harbored a relatively assertive Chinese identity, in August 1993.

After the split in 1993, the KMT under Lee has itself subsequently transformed to a Taiwanese party, either judging from its ethnic composition or its increasingly flexible approach to the status issue. Just before the formation of NP, Lee invented the idea of "Republic of China on Taiwan" and said,

I am the president of Republic of China. I neither lead the idea of *One China One Taiwan* nor mention *One China*. I only emphasize

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<sup>38</sup>These included the end of the "Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (1991)," the wholesale restructuring of the distorted parliaments (1991 and 1992), the revision of the sedition law (1992), the abandon of blacklist system and the Garrison Command of Taiwan (1992), the revision of the ROC constitution (1993-1995), and the beginning of the first ever direct presidential election (1996) (Tzu-Sung Chen, 1995: 216).

the *Republic of China on Taiwan*. (February 6, 1993, talk with Taiwanese Legislator; quoted from T'ao, 1998; emphasis added)

The *Republic of China on Taiwan* is a sovereign country. (May 20, 1993, press conference; quoted from Feigenbaum, 1995: 8; emphasis added)

From this perspective, Lee and his Taiwanese KMT, in spite of the rhetoric of "Reunification of China" or "Chinese people," in reality seek to articulate a variant of Taiwanese national identity. Differently put, to the new KMT, Taiwan's status issue no longer assumes that a "One China" solution is the *only* possible basis for a resolution of the Taiwan-China conflict. Rather, "One China, Two Governments" and a variety of proposals that smack of "Two Chinas" or even "One China, One Taiwan" scenarios are seriously considered as possible alternative solutions. As Moondy's comment shows, "KMT can keep an abstract commitment to reunification while resisting any concrete measures that might lead to that result" (1992: 134).

#### *An Institutionalized DPP: The Parliamentary Nationalism*

For decades, the *Tang-Wai* or the later DPP has competed quite successfully in the electoral arena by riding on discourses like Taiwanization, Taiwanese consciousness, self-determination, or even Taiwanese nationalism. However, the more electoral strength the DPP gains, the more it becomes an institutionalized electoral party. The more it wades into the mode of an electoral party, the more it has to consider the ordinary people's concern about the possibility of China's military threat. The electoral system in Taiwan, which places a substantive check on any political actor's ability to attempt bold policy shifts, plays a significant role in this process. Because Taiwan's election cycle is so short --- legislative terms are only three years, and the island is currently undergoing a year-to-year election cycle in which national and local elections are being held --- the policy processes have become highly politicized. With parties forced to seek public legitimation so frequently, elections take on the character of referenda. These political realities promote incrementalism in the policy process: a DPP victory and quick declaration of independence might appear unduly provocative.

In the 1991 election of the second National Assembly, which was held right after the Taiwan independence clause was put at the center of its platform, the DPP focused very much on the issues of Taiwan independence through the release of a "Taiwan new constitution," but suffered a somewhat unexpected defeat. In the wake of defeat, the DPP most likely believes that outright independence would scare away rather than snare the electorates at this stage of democratization. Therefore, in the 1992 election of the second

Legislative Yuan, the DPP indeed stepped back from the extreme position of the independence platform. Instead, it advanced a formula of "One Taiwan, One China" and seemed more subtle than ever in explaining to the general electorate the disincentives of reunification. One line of argument was that Taiwan, a disproportionately small island in scope, would exhaust its wealth and prosperity if united with China. The electoral results showed a dramatic rebound of DPP's political strength.

To the DPP, the verbal toning down of the Taiwan independence appeal reached its height in the elections for Taiwan's Governor and the Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral races in 1994. During the campaign, the DPP candidate for Taipei mayor, Chen Shui-Pien, reversed his old patterns for Taiwan independence or Taiwanese nationalism. Rather, he advanced a new theory of "ethnic harmony" without emotionally stirring up either the hatred of the Taiwanese about Mainlanders or the scare of Taiwan independence.<sup>39</sup> As a result, Chen won the mayoral race by a popular vote margin of 44%, higher than the Chinese New Party candidate Chao Shao-K'ang (30%) and the KMT candidate Huang Ta-Chou (26%).

At the core of DPP's official ideology is of course Taiwanese nationalism, but this underwent a subtle transformation in the process of the party's institutionalization within Taiwan's electoral system. In the 1990s, a process of redefining the quasi-revolutionary political movement into a radical party in a parliamentary democracy was set in motion. The idea of Taiwan Independence, of which the meaning had been extremely unclear due to the lack of either consensus or discussion among party elite, was redefined, or finally clarified, by the transformed DPP in *reformist* terms: the goal of abolishing the ROC system and establishing an independent Republic of Taiwan is to be pursued through democratic procedures such as referenda; until the majority of Taiwanese people agree to this platform, the DPP is willing to accept the name of ROC. In a sense, we may say that the subversive, unruly, and emotionally charged quest for Taiwan Independence was thus transformed into a rational and domesticated "parliamentary nationalism."

The taste for continuous growth and winning in the electoral competitions and the probable prospect of becoming a ruling party in the near future has certainly pushed the DPP into the course of a loyal opposition within the system. Therefore, the DPP has to consider China, rather than the KMT, which became the DPP's competitor

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<sup>39</sup>Chen Shui-Pien's campaign theme was "happiness, hope, and new Taipei." There was nothing to do with Taiwan independence or Taiwanese nationalism in this campaign theme.

within the system, as the most serious "obstacle" while conducting its project of establishing an independent Taiwan. The political trend in the 1990s has seemed to push the DPP to shift its perspective from the KMT as a foreign authoritarian regime, to China as a threat to Taiwan identity and the island's security. However, the radical forces within the Taiwan Independence Movement felt the DPP's betrayal of the goal of Taiwan independence and formed the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP) in 1996.

### *The 1996 Presidential Election: Reaction to China's Military Threat*

Since Lee Teng-Hui succeeded Chiang Ching-Kuo as president, Lee's gradual repositioning of Taiwan identity had a great deal of overlapping concerns with the DPP's Taiwan independence ideas and programs. Especially since the early 1990s, both the KMT and the DPP have evolved into an interacting process in which the *competition for the electorate* is commonly emphasized and *China's military threat* has gradually become a shared concern for both parties. In the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism, external dynamics, namely the military threat from China, also play a significant role in influencing the formation of Taiwan's nation-state.

China has watched the political democratization in Taiwan conducted by Lee Teng-Hui with grave misgiving. Although a member of the ruling party, Lee is an ethnic Taiwanese and may thus appear to Chinese leaders to have weaker ties to the Mainland than his predecessor. While questioning the viability of a Western democratic system in Taiwan in general, the Chinese government was particularly worried about the implications of such a system for Taiwan's future. Furthermore, China also viewed the rapid rise of the opposition DPP with strong disapproval and the development of Taiwan independence activities with much concern. The uprising of Taiwanese consciousness and the growing louder of the voice for Taiwan independence also gave Chinese leaders an increasing sense of crisis over the looming prospect that Taiwan might walk away and become a new nation-state.

China's fear kept accumulating as Taiwan was progressing to be more democratic and more autonomous, culminating in a series of military exercises around Taiwan, an action that was inflamed by two recent events. The first one was that the Taiwanese president Lee Teng-Hui was able to break China's political blockage to visit the U.S. in June, 1995 under the excuse of returning to his Alma Mater, Cornell University, as an honored guest speaker on a class of '68 reunion. The second one was that the people of Taiwan, for the first time in its history, directly elected their president on March 23, 1996, an event that received wide support and attention from the international community. Much to China's shock, Lee ended up with a 54% majority

vote. In fact, with this election's stage being focused on the stateness issue, if Lee's position were indeed for Taiwan independence, as claimed by China, then with the additional 21% votes for the DPP candidate, Dr. Ming-Min Peng, a strong Taiwan independence advocate, the total number of votes for Taiwan independence would amount to 75%, an extremely humiliating result to the Chinese government (Lin, 1996: 90).

Table 5 illustrates the trends of people's national identity in the 1990s. First, while comparing surveys conducted in 1991 and 1993, data show that there was a visible percentage jump during the two years, with Taiwanese identity rising from 13.6% to 27.2% and Chinese identity rising from 13.0% to 33.4%, a fact which "might be the direct result of the elite's mobilization of the mass" (Lin, 1996: 5) for the elections. Second, in 1995, the percentage of people with Taiwanese identity (i.e., 30.3%) was larger than the percentage of people with Chinese identity (i.e., 18.9%), the first occurrence of this kind of episode since these surveys on national identity began in the mid-1980s. However, it is notable that the percentage of people with mixed identities was still the highest one (i.e., 45.1%). Finally, the result of a 1997 survey warrants more attention. Compared with previous surveys, Taiwanese identity has increased from 13.6% in 1991 to 36.9% in 1997. This implies the existence of positive and stable growth of Taiwanese identity during the past several years. Furthermore, the extent of Taiwanese identity (i.e., 36.9%) was also a little stronger than the degree of mixed identities (i.e., 34.8%). This is a totally new phenomenon in the Taiwanese history.

**Table 5: National Identity of People Residing in Taiwan, 1991 – 1997**  
(by percentage)

Identity	1991	1993	1995	1997
Taiwanese first	13.6	27.2	30.3	36.9
Equally Taiwanese and Chinese	73.7	33.8	45.1	34.8
Chinese first	13.0	33.4	18.9	23.1
Others	0.7	5.7	5.8	5.2

Note: 1991 Survey on Social Orientation in the Taiwan Area was conducted by the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. The 1993 survey was conducted by the Workshop on Political Systems and Political Change, National Taiwan University, Taiwan. The 1995 Survey on Social Change in Taiwan was conducted by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. The 1997 survey was conducted by Mainland Affair Council of the Executive Yuan, Taiwan.

Source: Adapted from Lin (1996: 6) and Luo (1997).

When both the KMT and the DPP face the military threat of the Chinese regime as a common concern, the interaction of the two parties will probably lead to a similar stance of "neither a quick unification nor a quick independence." Moody concludes:



It may be necessary to interject a caution. It is correct to emphasize the difference between the KMT and opposition on the symbolic status of Taiwan. At the same time, however, at least since the early 1970s and the cooling of U.S. support for the KMT, regime and opposition have shared a common fate. Both have an overriding interest in keeping Taiwan an autonomous entity, at least as long as the mainland regime is in any way threatening" (Moody, 1992: 81).

## Conclusion

This paper began by questioning the adequacy of the major existing models to explain the emergence of separatist nationalism. As an alternative model, I conceptualized separatist nationalism as an interactive episodic discourse which *views the "making of nation" as a "crafting identity process" shaped by both socioeconomic and political developments, conceived and articulated in an emerging nationalist discourse.* This conception of separatist nationalism differs from theories that treat nationalism as a set of ideas internalized by actors of pre-existing "nations" or connected to interests.

This approach suggests an interaction model to explore the emergence of a "new" nationalist discourse through examining the convergence of different ideologies proposed by the KMT state and opposition forces. For the KMT regime on Taiwan, nothing more readily and importantly forged primary concern than the ignominious loss of China and the wish to retake the mainland. Thus, this party-state developed a series of discursive packages, including discourses of *fa-tung* and mainland recovery, to implement its China-centered ideology. Paralleling the escalation of Chinese nationalism proposed by the KMT state every step of the way, and largely caused by it, is the steady intensification of counter Taiwanese nationalism promoted by the Taiwanese opposition forces. The latter in turn invited reactions from the former. Although the Taiwanese opposition forces began as a demand for democratization before 1974, soon after the political reforms initiated by Chiang Ching-Kuo it took an ethnic equality turn against institutional discrimination based on ethnicity, and by the late 1980s it had transformed into a nationalist movement proposing the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan. Since Li Teng-Hui succeeded Chiang Ching-Kuo as president, his repositioning of Taiwan identity had a great deal of overlapping concerns with the DPP's Taiwan independence ideas and programs. Especially during the 1990s, both the KMT and the DPP have evolved into an interacting process in which the competition for the electorate is commonly emphasized, and the CCP's military has gradually become a shared primary concern.

Table 6 briefly reviews the interaction of ideologies between the KMT state and opposition forces at different stages.

**Table 6: The Interaction of Ideologies among KMT State and Opposition Forces**

	<b>Context</b>	<b>KMT State's Counter-Discourse</b>	<b>Opposition Forces' Discourse</b>
<b>Stage 1:</b> <u>Pre-1974</u>	Threat of PRC and problem of China representation in the international arena	China-centered ideology and emergent situation claim	<i>Free China's</i> liberal democratic ideology
<b>Stage 2:</b> <u>1975-1979</u>	International derecognition and emergence of a new generation	Taiwanization policy, discourse of "disunifying the solidarity between Taiwanese and mainlanders", and counter-movement based on anti-Communist ideology	<i>Tang-Wai's</i> demand for democratization and Taiwanization
<b>Stage 3:</b> <u>1980-1985</u>	US diplomatic setback and PRC's proposal of peaceful reunification	Repression policy and discourse of "three-in-one enemy"	<i>Tang-Wai's</i> radicalization: self-determination and Taiwanese consciousness
<b>Stage 4:</b> <u>1986-1990</u>	Emergence of civil society	Liberalization policy and discourse of PRC's military threat to Taiwan	DPP's Taiwanese nationalism
<b>Stage 5:</b> <u>Post-1990</u>	Re-emergence of PRC's military threat	Invention of the idea "Republic of China on Taiwan"	DPP's parliamentary nationalism

Taiwanese nationalism is directed at the creation of a nation that never existed, while nationalism of the "old" KMT and indeed the Han chauvinism of Chinese elite is directed at the restoration of a past state in which the nation was most fully itself. Each of the two forms of nationalism arose as the responses of a community that felt that the place it viewed as its own polity was governed by an illegitimate regime that did not represent the community's own basic cultural values (Breuilly, 1982: 349). For Chinese nationalists, most of whom are Mainlanders, the alien regime to which they reacted was the Communist one. The government they wished to have would encompass all China and be a Chinese nation-state that would restore a situation long undermined by the Communists. Chinese nationalism reflects Mainlanders' efforts to cope with the competition they feel

toward the Communists on the mainland and their reaction to a reality that they have not otherwise been able to control.

Taiwanese nationalism promoted by Taiwanese was their effort to cope with the competition they felt toward the Mainlander elite in Taiwan at the early stage, and the CCP in mainland China at the latter stage. The government many Taiwanese hope to establish would be chosen by the majority of Taiwan's residents and would, quite likely, declare itself to be an independent state. It would constitute a Taiwanese nation-state, a political association that has never been permitted to exist before.

I have some suggestions for future research on the topic of separatist nationalism. First, analysis of the rise of separatist nationalism should consider the broad episodic context in which it emerges, the international context including not only the world inter-state system but also the nature of international ideological relations, and the relationships between the state and civil society. Second, because separatist nationalism arises within the context of a dialectic between the state and its opposition, the ideology of the state is an important clue to understanding the kind of ideology most likely to become the ideology of the opposition. The probability of the emergence of a new separatist nationalist ideology is enhanced if the state ideology and the ideology proposed by the opposition belong to different ideological universes. Finally, consideration should be given to the basic themes, ritual performances, and symbolic structures of the opposition ideology. These parameters determine the internal dynamics of ideology as they shape human actions and limit the options available to diverse actors.

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