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TAIWAN IN THE MODERN WORLD

Memories of the Future

National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan

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An East Gate Book

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— 3 —

Who Joined the Clandestine Political Organization?

Some Preliminary Evidence from the Overseas Taiwan Independence Movement

Wei-der Shu

The Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM), the vanguard of Taiwanese nationalism, originated in the mid-1940s, when the Kuomintang (KMT) took over Taiwan at the end of World War II. However, due to severe state repression, the TIM had to formulate its organizational infrastructure in political circles away from the island. From the late 1940s, activists began to organize clandestine political organizations in Hong Kong and Japan to question the legitimacy of the KMT's rule over Taiwan. Starting in the mid-1950s, the idea of Taiwanese nationalism gradually found some resonance among Taiwanese students who were studying in North America. It can be said that of all the phenomena that characterized the history of Taiwan in the 1990s, the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism has had the most dramatic impact on its political landscape (Shu 1998).

Indeed, since World War II, U.S. universities have become the training ground of elites from the Third World countries, particularly those who had not been subject to European colonial rule. Taiwan is no exception. In the United States, a territory far beyond the sovereignty of Taiwan, the KMT government has still maintained a strong network that can infiltrate the college and university campuses across the New World. According to Michael Glennon, who helped conduct a study of KMT's agents in America for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the KMT intelligence agencies "have conducted extended harassment, intimidation, and surveillance of the United States residents here on American soil" (quoted in Cohen, 1991, 25). Without a doubt, the presence and activities of the KMT's agents on U.S. cam-

puses and in other community organizations have created a chilling atmosphere for overseas Taiwanese who might otherwise have been eager to test the more open political environment they found in America.

In spite of repression and the KMT's campaigns against the Taiwanese national culture, the Taiwanese nationalist movement still blossomed and became an overseas political force in the 1960s. In January 1970, the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), an ally of various overseas organizations advocating Taiwan independence, was formed in New York City. On April 24, 1970, the vice premier of the Republic of China. Chiang Ching-Kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's eldest son, was nearly assassinated by two WUFI members. As a counterblow to the KMT's arbitrary arrest of Taiwanese dissidents in the Kaohsiung Incident, a large protest demonstration organized by the oppoisition force, in December 1979, the overseas TIM also launched a series of activities targeting KMT representative offices in the United States. In other words, a number of Taiwanese joined the clandestine political organizations and played the role of political exiles in the struggle against the KMT dictatorship and in the development of Taiwanese nationalism.

The focus of this chapter is the political activism of these overseas TIM activists. Based on in-depth interviews with fourteen TIM activists' life histories, the chapter deals with a very fundamental aspect of activism in the clandestine political organizations: Who joined these organizations? The central questions I will address in this study are: Who are those individuals engaging in clandestine political activities such as the overseas TIM? What are their social origins? Until recently, these questions have remained unanswered, as discussion of Taiwanese nationalism was taboo for ordinary Taiwanese people as well as social scientists conducting Taiwan studies under the KMT's authoritarian rule. It is only recently, with the change in the political climate and the availability of new sources of information, that it has become possible to analyze the phenomenon. Even in this situation, compared to other subjects in the field of Taiwan studies, the TIM, especially the postwar overseas TIM, is a relatively ignored research subject.[1] This research is a preliminary attempt to bridge this gap.

Activism in Clandestine Political Organizations

Within the literature on clandestine political organizations, researchers often explain the most radical forms of collective action by the assumed pathology of the activists. Eric Hoffer's (1951) notion of the "true believer" can be seen

as a representative of this tendency, which describes activists as frustrated individuals, blindly obedient to a leader or following the mass, content to lose their "unwanted" selves. In the case of clandestine political groups, participation has been related to low self-esteem, impatience, uncompromising attitudes, a tendency to blame others, relative deprivation, social uprootedness, personality dependence, egocentrism, and frustrated attempts to build positive identities (e.g., Crenshaw 1986; Kornhauser 1959; Livingstone 1982). Following the tradition of collective behavior studies, these researchers emphasize the discontinuities between "normal" political behavior and deviant political behavior.

One of the main critiques of this trend of studies addresses their empirical validity. As Donatolla della Porta contends (1988, 156), these aforementioned interpretations, however, "have never been proven by empirical research." Even in the few cases in which militants have been given personality tests, the subjects were individuals who had passed through two "total institutions"—the clandestine organization and the prison system (della Porta 1992, 7). As the research of Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart (1992, 60) demonstrates, "personality, rather than a prior given, changed as a result of affiliation with the group." Thus, this "pathology" offers little help for this research in the case of overseas TIM activists. In order to conduct the following empirical investigation, we have to look for some other route to solve the puzzle.

Considering terrorist groups as forms of political organization, albeit with particular characteristics, may suggest alternative hypotheses about individual participation. In investigating these alternatives, we can draw insights from the general literature about social movement organizations. In other words, rather than focusing on the discontinuities between clandestine political organizations and social movement organizations,[2] we can take into account the continuities between different forms of political activism. We can see della Porta's argument in the following:

> [T]he motivation to join terrorist groups can be understood within the framework of categories used for *other types of political organizations,* especially those which are less well-equipped with institutional resources [emphasis added]. (1988, 156)

Following this argument about the continuity between the clandestine political organizations and other types of political organizations, I will assume that the general literature on social movements provides the valuable analytical tools for the explanatory model of activism in clandestine political organizations.

As far as the social movement literature is concerned, a diversity of opinion also exists there about the "best" theoretical framework to employ regarding the origins of political activism. Confronting the immense variety of writings on social movements, two approaches can be seen as direct approaches of political activism: marginality thesis and the privilege thesis.[3]

On the one hand, some researchers hold that the behavior of the less institutionalized forms of political participation is accepted more readily in the marginal strata of the population than in any others. Vulnerability to social-movement participation is in part a function of being weakly attached or peripheral to existing social networks. Readiness to participate comes from an absence of those conditions that integrate people into the system. With this emphasis on the cohesive functions of movements, movements are viewed as surrogate families and primary groups that meet previously isolated participants' needs for social affiliation, a sense of belongingness, and group identity (Kornhauser 1959). I label this position the "marginality thesis." From this perspective, activists tend to be marginal people in their societies—that is, they deviate in significant and perceptible ways from accepted norms, whether social, psychological, or physical. This thesis is supported by Peter Waldmann's empirical research (1922). In his study of several ethnic underground organizations like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and *Euskadi ta-Askatun* (ETA),[4] he finds that the militants are mainly from the lower or lower-middle classes.

On the other hand, some scholars propose a second, quite opposite thesis focusing on the middle class. This maintains that the radicalization of a working-class ideology in a middle class is a psychological device to "compensate" for bourgeois origins (Braungart and Braungart 1992; Keniston 1968). I label this position the "privilege thesis." Klaus Wasmund (1986, 201), after analyzing 227 life histories of leftist terrorists from West Germany, concludes that the terrorists "come mostly from the upper middle classes." Nearly every other terrorist (47 percent) has a father who holds a so-called higher position. The level of education of the terrorists is correspondingly of an above-average standard (Wasmund, 1986, 202). From this perspective, activists could be individuals who are very strongly rooted in the social system. High social status could be considered conducive to collective action since it implies that an individual has specific skills as well as great probability of success. Furthermore, more free time and a small risk of social sanction have also been mentioned to account for the higher propensity of young people to mobilize. I will try to solve the contention between the marginality thesis and the privilege thesis by presenting my original data on the social origins of fourteen interviewees.

Fourteen Life Histories

In many respects, the data obtained from the open-ended interviews serves as the main sources of information for this study. Fourteen life histories of the overseas TIM activists are presented in this paper.[5] Ideally, an analysis of the personal backgrounds of the overseas TIM rank-and-file activists would require data on a random sample of all activists. Unfortunately, in clandestine political organizations like the overseas TIM, it is difficult, if not impossible, to access this kind of information. Secret organizations, of course, do not provide public access to their membership files. No comprehensive or even partial listing of overseas TIM activists exists. Therefore, I relied instead on three indirect methods to identify these TIM activists in North America and conduct my interview. First, the initial set of respondents came from the public accounts about overseas TIM activists, that is, those activists who used their names publicly as leaders or spokesmen for the overseas TIM.[6] Then, other respondents were identified and recommended to me through my personal networks. The remainder of the respondents came as the result of referrals from the first and second groups of respondents.

The interview questions were designed to examine the role of the participants in overseas TIM to document the history of their involvement with the organizations, their motivations for joining, and how they fit into the organizational structure. The interviewers also gathered biographical data, examined participants' perceptions regarding their role in overseas TIM, and investigated what influence involvement in the organization had on the participants' personal development. Interviews took place between September 1995 and February 1997.

The Blacklists

These fourteen case studies of activists' life histories have been supplemented by two other data sets, one derived from Dang (1991, 172–179), the other originated from Kwei-Ch'üan Wang (1991). I refer to the first list as "blacklist record I." This is a list of seventy-six people on the "Taiwanese-American Homeland Visit Group Member's Roster" as of April 1991. This group was organized by the Federation of Taiwanese in Southern California and the Taiwanese Association of America in December 1990. The principle purpose of this group was to challenge the KMT government's "notorious and ridiculous so-called "blacklist policy" (Dang 1991, 171)," which barred thousands of people from entering or returning to Taiwan.[7] After some serious arguments with the KMT government, more than sixty members out of the original seventy-six members of this group were still denied visas to visit

Taiwan. To some degree, we could treat members of this group as activists of the overseas TIM, at least from the perspective of the KMT government.

I term the second list "blacklist record II." It is a report on seventy-four blacklisted people around the world (most of them residing in the United States) compiled and written in Chinese by a journalist from Taiwan in 1991. Based upon the location of the interview, this book is divided into four parts: the western United States, the eastern United States, the Central United States, and Japan. It is notable that there is some membership overlap between the two lists.

Both lists provide only the activists' name, year of birth, native place, educational background, professional experience, and community involvement. In Wang's book, there is also an extracted short statement describing the interviewee's rationale for joining the TIM. I will use these blacklist records, together with my fourteen case studies, to illustrate several important characteristics of overseas TIM activists.[8]

The Genesis of the Taiwan Independence Movement

The genesis of the overseas TIM can be traced back to the February 28 Incident, as chapter two has shown.[9] The suppression of the February 28 Incident proved to the Taiwanese the dictatorial nature of the KMT regime in Taiwan, a rule that was characterized by the oppression of one group of people, the Taiwanese, by another, the Mainlanders. However, as most of the Taiwanese elite had been jailed or executed in the Incident, the opposition movement was virtually in the hands of a few surviving members of the Taiwanese elite in exile or other overseas dissidents. The Incident crystallized the development of Taiwanese nationalist feelings. As these feelings developed, the overseas Taiwanese living in Japan started the TIM in the early 1950s (Ong 1964, 167; Mendel 1970, 147). In the United States, because Taiwanese students came to this country after the late 1950s, the TIM also blossomed in the 1960s.

In 1956, Wen-I Liao (Thomas Liao) and his associates set up the *Taiwan gongheguo linshi zhengfu* (Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa) in Japan, the chief intellectual and political center for overseas anti-KMT activities in the 1950s and 1960s. In February 1960, some younger Taiwanese students in Japan founded another TIM organization, *Taiwan qingnian she* (Taiwan chinglian [youth] associates), which was renamed the *Taiwan qingnian hui* (Formosan Association) in 1963. Believing that propaganda work and clandestine organizations were the most critical activities at that time, the association began to publish *Taiwan chinglian* in Japanese and the *Formosan Quarterly* in English (Ong 1964, 169–170). In 1965, the for-

mal name of this organization was again changed to the *Taiwan qingnian duli lianmeng* (United Young Formosans for Independence) (Ming-Cheng Chen, 1992) (see Figure 3.1).

In the United States, up to 1965 no unified, nationwide organization for Taiwan independence had been founded, though a number of local groups were actively engaged in the movement, notably those in New York, Philadelphia, Kansas, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and California. Among these local groups, Formosans' Free Formosa (3F)[10] (*Taiwanren de ziyou Taiwan*) was the first as well as the most significant organization advocating Taiwan independence in North America. This organization was founded by Jung-Hsün Lin (John Lin), I-Te Chen (Edward Chen), and Chu-I Loo (Jay Loo) in Philadelphia in 1956. Later, 3F was restructured and renamed the United Formosans for Independence (UFI) (*Taiwan duli lianmeng*) in 1958.

In Madison, Wisconsin, there was also another well-organized group called the Formosan Affairs Study Group (*Taiwan wenti yanjiu hui*), actively conducting political campaigns under the leadership of Shebing Ciu, a medical doctor. In October 1965, a meeting called the Formosan Leadership Unity Congress was held in Madison, Wisconsin, where leading figures of the independence movement from all over the country gathered and agreed to make preparations for a unified organization. In the following year, a new organization, the United Formosans in America for Independence (UFAI) (*Quan-Mei Taiwan duli lianmeng*) was born (King 1974, 22).

In Canada, Yi-Ming Huang (Robert Y. M. Huang) and Che-fu Lin (Albert Lin) founded the League for Self-determination of Formosans (*Taiwan zhumin zijue lianmeng*) in 1963. Two years later, this organization was renamed the Committee for Human Rights in Formosa (*Taiwan renquan weiyuanhui*). This title was based on the task of rescuing Peng Ming-min[11] in the name of human rights (Nan-Fang Shuo 1980, 64). In Europe, the Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe (UFIE) was founded in 1965 through the effort of Sekun Kang (King 1974, 22). In 1968, the UYFI in Japan, the UFAI in the United States, the UFIE in Europe, and the Committee for Human Rights in Formosa in Canada made a joint declaration, announcing that two magazines—*Taiwan Chinglian* and *The Independent Formosa*[12]—were to be their joint organs. This was to be the first step toward a complete amalgamation of the TIM organizations throughout the world. In 1970, the expected worldwide organization was started under the name of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) (*Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng*).

In addition to WUFI, there also existed some other, smaller organizations, most of them located in Japan and North America, advocating the ideas of both socialism and Taiwan independence. They labeled themselves the

Figure 3.1

The Evolution of World United Formosans for Independence, 1956–1970



Source: Wei-der Shu

"Taiwan Left," as they rejected not only the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party's claim to Taiwan, but also the WUFI's ignorance of welfare programs for the needy and the poor (Shu 1996a). Most of my informants in this study were activists in WUFI-related organizations, though some of them partly shared the ideological position of the Taiwan Left. There is no "great" reason for excluding the Taiwan Left activists in this study. The only explanation is that I had great difficulty in accessing those activists, albeit I spent a lot of time in trying to locate those people.

Biographical Roots of Activism

Activists' Ethnic Background

In terms of the respondents in my case studies, the overseas TIM consists predominantly of native Taiwanese, including Hoklo (twelve persons, or 86 percent) and Hakka (two persons, or 14 percent), but neither Mainlanders nor Aboriginals are to be found among them. Neither blacklist provided details of the respondents' ethnic backgrounds. Since Taiwanese were the main victims of the February 28 Incident, it is natural that they made up most participants in the TIM. This finding is also very similar to Rejai and Phillips's (1983, 51) work about the characteristics of revolutionary elites. In their research, they discovered that most revolutionary elites belong to the *main ethnic groups in their societies.*

Age Distribution

Next, let us explore data on the age of the TIM activists (see Table 3.1). This indicates that most of them were born in the 1930s (43 percent of my case studies, 33 percent of the blacklist record I, and 42 percent of blacklist record II) and the 1940s (36 percent of the case studies, 55 percent of the blacklist record, and 39 percent of blacklist record II). Only a few respondents were born in the 1950s (14 percent of my informants, 12 percent of record I, and 9 percent of record II) and even fewer in the 1960s (7 percent, 0 percent, and 1 percent).

How could we explain the uneven age distribution of those activists? Why do people born in the 1930s and the 1940s compose the majority of overseas TIM activists? One possible explanation, the "publicity" thesis, is based on the distinction between the first and successive generations of activists, or between founders and followers. While the generations of the 1930s and 1940s could be treated as the founders of this second-wave overseas TIM, the generations of the 1950s and 1960s are definitely the followers of this movement. It could be said that the founders occupy the highest ranks in the organizations already when followers join. To a certain extent, the founders also control the organization's resources, information, and money. Furthermore, the founders have created the group's rules and are likely to have a higher emotional involvement with the organization than the followers. Accordingly, the generations of the 1950s and the 1960s, compared to the latter generations, tended to occupy the more publicized position in the overseas TIM. The "overrepresentation" of generations of the 1930s and the 1940s in the TIM could be understood from this logic of "publicity." During my inter-

Table 3.1 **Age Distribution of Overseas TIM Activists**

Sample	1910–1919	1920–1929	1930–1939	1940–1949	1950–1959	1960 or later	Unknown	N
Case Studies	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	6 (43%)	5 (36%)	2 (14%)	1 (7%)	0 (0%)	14 (100%)
Blacklist Record I	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	25 (33%)	42 (55%)	9 (12%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	76 (100%)
Blacklist Record II	1 (1%)	2 (3%)	31 (42%)	29 (39%)	7 (9%)	1 (1%)	3 (4%)	74 (99%)

Source: Wei-der Shu

view with him, one informant born after 1950 made similar comments about the phenomenon, when I mentioned that the number of TIM activists born after 1950 was relatively small. He expressed that

> It does not make sense to say that there are so few people born after 1950 participating in the Taiwan Independence Movement. Maybe they are just not as famous as those old guys. But they are really right there, based on my own understanding. (Life history no. M3: 31)[13]

In other words, the "publicity" thesis interprets the dominance of the 1930s and the 1940s generations in the TIM as the result of their "louder voices." Therefore, it treats this dominance as a "superficial" phenomenon, rather than a "factual" reality. However, there is an alternative hypothesis, which takes this dominance as a reality. This alternative thesis tries to illustrate the dominance of the 1930s and the 1940s generations in the overseas TIM through the concept of "1960s historical generation."[14] This concept is developed by Braungart (1993) in his ambitious project of explaining the rise of youth-movement activity over the last 170 years throughout the world. To him, youth movements around the world have not been random political behavior but have clustered around four periods in world time. These periods can be identified as the "Young Europe, Post-Victorian, Great Depression, and 1960s Historical Generations" (Braungart 1993, 118). These historical generations represent "unique patterns of social and political behavior that converge on the exposure or experience of historical events, the age-conscious interpretation of these events, and the dynamic models of responses to these events" (Braungart 1993, 114). In this sense, the 1960s represent a watershed in post–World War II youth-movement activity that occurred on every continent around the world.

It is notable that most of the 1930s and 1940s generations of TIM activists came to North America for advanced studies in the 1960s (50 percent of my case studies and 58 percent of blacklist record II, see Table 3.2). In the relatively liberal environment, with the stimuli of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, those Taiwanese were exposed to various liberal, or even radical, ideologies. The influence was reinforced by contemporary global nationalism and the new political culture made possible by modern technology and communications systems. Furthermore, most of the 1930s and 1940s generation were in their early childhood during the 1947 massacre. In terms of the emotional attachment to the February 28 Incident, their personal experience during childhood makes this generation very different from the generations born after the 1950s. While considering the 1947 incident as the origin of the Taiwan independence movement, it is understandable that the generations of the 1930s and 1940s figure prominently among these overseas TIM activists.

Due to the impossibility of finding a comprehensive list of overseas TIM activists at this stage, it is very difficult to evaluate the relative strength and weakness of the "publicity" thesis and the "1960s historical generation" thesis. I suggest that the reader treat these two hypotheses as complementary rather than competing, since I believe both theses could explain *part* of this phenomenon.

Age at Enrolling in the TIM

Most of my informants came to North America as graduate students, and after earning their degree, took jobs and stayed here.[15] Furthermore, most of them tended to be in their middle to late twenties when they came to North America for graduate studies. This specific "life course" can be understood through the following dimensions. First, since the KMT government did not allow students to study abroad for an undergraduate degree, most of the Taiwanese students came to North America as graduate students. After finishing sixteen years of schooling, the normal age of graduate students tends to be at least twenty-two. Second, in Taiwan, every male citizen has to fulfill the military service obligation for at least one year. Finally, before attending graduate school abroad, most students worked several years to accumulate the professional experience and raise the necessary tuition. Therefore, these TIM activists' typical career beyond the sea began at around their middle to late twenties. Almost all my informants fit this observation, the only exceptions are D3 and I1. D3 did not arrive in the United States through the graduate student route but, instead, came through kinship ties at the age of forty-three. I1 spent several years in Europe for graduate study before attending the Ph.D. program of an American university at the age of thirty-five.

Table 3.2 **Year Overseas TIM Activists Went to North America**

Sample	1950–1959	1960–1969	1970–1979	1980 or later	Unknown	N
Case Studies	0 (0%)	7 (50%)	4 (28.6%)	3 (21.4%)	0 (0%)	14 (100.0%)
Blacklist Record II	2 (4%)	33 (58%)*	15 (26%)†	6 (11%)	1 (2%)	57 (100%)‡

Source: Wei-der Shu

*Includes one activist who went to the United States for advanced study twice; once in 1967 and once in 1974. After finishing the first study, he went back to Taiwan in 1969.

†Includes one activist who went to the United States for master's degree in 1973. After returning to Taiwan for several years, he went to the United States again for Ph.D. study in 1981.

‡Seventeen activists are excluded in this table because their overseas destination after leaving Taiwan was other than North America (e.x., Japan, Europe, or Latin America).

After coming to North America, most of my informants almost immediately entered the overseas TIM network. Then, among all respondents, at least half of them (i.e., D4, I1, I2, M3, M5, U1, and Z2) made the decision to join the movement within one or two years. In other words, most of the TIM members were under thirty years of age when they joined the organization. We can say that the overseas TIM was a typical youth movement. This finding coincides fairly closely with researches about other clandestine political organizations. For instance, both Robert P. Clark's (1986) project on the lives of ETA members and Peter Waldmann's (1986) work on guerrilla movements in Argentina, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uruguay demonstrate that activists of these movements tend to be very young.

Gender Profile

The data on sexual composition reflects that the overseas TIM is dominated by male activists. In terms of the respondents of my case studies, almost all activists are male, except Z1. As far as both blacklist records are concerned, only twenty-one female activists (or 28 percent among all respondents) are listed in record I, and fifteen (or 20 percent among all respondents) are listed in record II. It is not unfair to describe the overseas TIM as "a predominantly male movement." Even though there are female members, who are, based on Friedhelm Neidhardt's (1992, 218) description of right-wing terrorist groups in Germany, "clear patriarchal annexations as girlfriends, fiancées, daughters, or wives of male members." For instance, even though Z1's husband was a member of WUFI, she did not join this organization

until 1985, fifteen years after she arrived in the United States. She made the following statement to explain this situation:

> I don't know why. . . . When my husband served as head of the local [WUFI] chapter, I made phone calls to contact comrades about the monthly meeting for him. Whenever George [then the chairperson of WUFI] came here for financial campaigning, I took him to visit the potential supporters. I participated in every activity sponsored by WUFI, even though I was not a formal member at that time. In 1985, *someone happened to find* that I was not a member of WUFI yet, so he asked me to file the application (emphasis added). (Life History no. Z1: 5)

Native Place

Where do the overseas TIM activists come from? Based upon the information about native place derived from my case studies, both blacklist records, and Taiwan's total population, we can encounter two interesting and seemingly significant observations (see Table 3.3). First, while taking "region" as the unit of analysis, almost half of the respondents (42.9 percent of my case studies, 47.4 percent of record I, and 45.9 percent of record II) come from the southern region of Taiwan. As far as the total population in Taiwan is concerned, the proportion of people living in the southern region is only 29.7 percent. Accordingly, it is reasonable to claim that people from southern Taiwan were more likely to participate in the overseas TIM.

Second, while taking "county" rather than region as the unit of analysis, the three largest pools of activists are from Tainan (35.7 percent of my case studies, 30.3 percent of blacklist record I, and 28.4 percent of blacklist record II), Taichung (21.4 percent, 19.7 percent, and 12.2 percent, respectively), and Taipei (7.1 percent, 11.8 percent, and 9.5 percent, respectively).[16] Residents of Tainan and Taichung make up only 8.4 percent and 9.8 percent of Taiwan's population, respectively. And Taipei has the highest share of the population, with 28.1 percent. People from Tainan and Taichung, especially those from Tainan, are more likely to engage in the overseas TIM, as their proportion among the activists is much larger than their proportion of Taiwan's total population. Furthermore, people from Taipei are less likely to join the overseas TIM, as their percentage of the activists is much smaller than the percentage of their total population of Taiwan.

To summarize, people from southern Taiwan, especially those from Tainan, are more likely to engage in the overseas TIM. This phenomenon is not found only by me (the researcher), but also discovered by some informants of my case studies, the subjects. During the interview, when I asked

Table 3.3 **Native Place of Overseas TIM Activists**

Native Place	Case Studies	Blacklist Record I	Blacklist Record II	People Living in Taiwan, 1989*
Northern Region	5 (35.7%)	18 (23.7%)	16 (21.6%)	8,450 (42.1%)
Taipei	1 (7.1%)	9 (11.8%)	7 (9.5%)	5,653 (28.1%)
Keelung	1 (7.1%)	1 (1.3%)	1 (1.4%)	348 (1.7%)
Ilan	2 (14.3%)	5 (6.6%)	7 (9.5%)	448 (2.2%)
Hsinchu	1 (7.1%)	3 (3.9%)	1 (1.4%)	688 (3.4%)
Taoyuan	0	0	0	1,313 (6.5%)
Central Region	3 (21.4%)	21 (27.6%)	18 (24.3%)	5,043 (25.2%)
Taichung	3 (21.4%)	15 (19.7%)	9 (12.2%)	1,973 (9.8%)
Nantou	0	3 (3.9%)	1 (1.4%)	533 (2.7%)
Changhua	0	2 (2.6%)	5 (6.7%)	1,234 (6.2%)
Yunlin	0	1 (1.3%)	1 (1.4%)	758 (3.8%)
Miaoli	0	0	2 (2.7%)	545 (2.7%)
Southern Region	6 (42.9%)	36 (47.4%)	34 (45.9%)	5,949 (29.7%)
Tainan	5 (35.7%)	23 (30.3%)	21 (28.4%)	1,688 (8.4%)
Kaohsiung	0	2 (2.6%)	3 (4.1%)	2,468 (12.3%)
Chiayi	1 (7.1%)	8 (10.5%)	7 (9.5%)	808 (4.0%)
Pingtung	0	3 (3.9%)	3 (4.1%)	889 (4.4%)
Penghu	0	0	0	96 (0.5%)
Eastern Region	0	0	0	607 (3.0%)
Other Than Taiwan	0	1 (1.3%)	2 (2.7%)	N.A.
China	0	1 (1.3%)	1 (1.4%)	
Japan	0	0	1 (1.4%)	
Unknown	0	0	4 (5.4%)	N.A.
N	14 (100%)	76 (100%)	74 (100%)	20,048 (100%)

Source: Wei-der Shu

*In thousands. Furthermore, the information is based on people's "registered place" rather than "native place." The original source is *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1989,* Table 9, published by Director-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 1990.

D4 to explain the phenomenon that "many overseas TIM activists are from Tainan," he said,

> I don't know. Maybe it is just an incident. Maybe there is some geographical connection or cultural connection. I don't know. While Hsu Hsin-liang just arrived in the United States, his relationship with WUFI was not bad. However, he broke the relationship and looked down the Taiwan independence movement later on. Someone asked him about the content of the Taiwanese consciousness of the Taiwan independence movement, he said "Their Taiwanese consciousness is nothing special, it is only the consciousness of the Chia-Nan Plain."[17] So, he [Hsu] looked down the Taiwan independence movement (Life history no. D4: 2). . . . So, in the mind of Hsu Hsin-liang, he felt that it is the "Tainan Gang" playing a critical role in the Taiwan independence movement. The reason was that there were too many

> activists who had graduated from Tainan First High School. At that time, there was a teacher called Ong Joktik at that school. He was teaching Chinese. Later on, he lived in exile in Japan and began to organize the Taiwan independence movement. Due to his *influence in terms of ideas,* many accepted the idea of Taiwan independence on coming to the United States and Japan (emphasis added). (Life history no. D4: 3)

Educational Level

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the attributes of these activists in this study is their high level of education (see Table 3.4). While taking my case studies into consideration, among 14 interviewees, 8 (57 percent) hold a doctorate, 4 (29 percent) have a master's degree, and only 2 (14 percent) have a bachelor's degree. As far as both data sets are concerned, 37 percent of record I and 46 percent of record II have a doctorate, 34 percent in both records hold a master's degree, 20 percent of record I and 12 percent of record II have a bachelor's degree, and only 5 percent in both sets have a high school education or less.

Several observations are of interest here. First, the educational level of activists derived from both records is quite *similar* to that of the interviewees in my case studies. Second, all data sets demonstrate that *over seven-tenths* of the activists were awarded at least a master's degree. Third, while considering the possible "sampling" problem, I do not think these figures are unreliable indicators, even if the sampling procedures in both data sets are not really "scientific." According to WUFI's open statement, "75 percent of their [WUFI's] members in the United States held a Ph.D. degree or at least a master's degree. To many people, WUFI might look more like an academic and intellectually oriented organization rather than a revolutionary group such as the PLO or the ANC in South Africa" (Chang 1991, 318). Finally, compared with other reference populations like Taiwanese living in the United States, people living in Taiwan, and people living in the United States, these TIM activists are still surprisingly well educated.

Occupation of Overseas TIM Activists

In order to round out the demographic profile of overseas TIM activists and thereby move closer to a more precise understanding of who has joined the movement, one further question calls for examination: From what social classes or socioeconomic categories within the larger social structure has the movement drawn the majority of its adherents? Since I had difficulty securing data pertaining directly to those activists' income levels, however, the only available information regarding the matter is the occupational composition

Table 3.4 **Educational Level of Overseas TIM Activists**

Sample	Doctorate	Master	Bachelor	High School or Less	Unknown	N
Case Studies	8 (57%)	4 (29%)	2 (14%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	14 (100%)
Blacklist Record I	28 (37%)	26 (34%)	15 (20%)	4 (5%)	3 (4%)	76 (100%)
Blacklist Record II	34 (46%)	25 (34%)	9 (12%)	4 (5%)	2 (3%)	74 (100%)
Taiwanese Living in the United States, 1990*	3,658 (8.3%)	9,549 (21.7%)	11,090 (25.2%)	19, 637 (44.7%)	0 (0%)	43,934 (99.9%)
People Living in Taiwan, 1990†	98,000§ (0.7%)		2,240,000" (15.1%)	12,473,000 (84.2%)	0 (0%)	14,811,000 (100.0%)
People Living in the United States,1990‡	1,205,426 (0.8%)	7,520,469 (4.7%)	20,832,567 (13.1%)	129,309,974 (81.3%)	0 (0%)	158,868,436 (99.9%)

Source: Wei-der Shu

*Based on Taiwanese population aged twenty-five and over living in the United States. The original source is *1990 Census of Population (Asian and Pacific Islanders in the United States), 1990 CP-3-5*, Table 3, published by U.S. Census Bureau, 1993.

†Based on Taiwanese population aged fifteen and over only. The original source is *An Extract Report on the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Taiwan-Fukien Area, Republic of China, Part I*, Table 6-4 and Table 6-6, published by Census Office of the Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 1992.

‡Based on people aged twenty-five and over living in the United States. The original source is *1990 Census of Population (Asian and Pacific Islanders in the United States), 1990 CP-3-5*, Table 3, published by U.S. Census Bureau, 1993.

§Original data does not separate people with doctorate and master's degree; data is combined here.

"Includes people with university and college education (986,000) and from junior college (1,254,000).

of those activists. Accordingly, I will try to shed some light on the above question by inferring the movement's socioeconomic base from its occupational profile, which is provided in Table 3.5.

First, given the fact that all my data sets indicate that at least half of the activists were employed in professional occupations (64.3 percent, 51.3 percent, and 62.2 percent, respectively), and given the fact that around 30 percent of overseas TIM activists worked for managerial specialty occupations (28.6 percent, 27.6 percent, and 18.9 percent, respectively), it seems fair to

Table 3.5 Occupation of Overseas TIM Activists

Case	Professional specialty occupations	Managerial specialty occupations	Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations	Service Occupations	Others or Unknown	N
Case Studies	9 (64.3%)	4† (28.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (7.1%)	0 (0%)	14 (100.0%)
Blacklist Record I	39 (51.3%)	21‡ (27.6%)	2 (2.6%)	3 (3.9%)	11 (14.5%)	76 (99.9%)
Blacklist Record II	46 (62.2%)	14**** (18.9%)	1 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	13 (17.6%)	74 (100.1%)
Taiwanese living in the United States, 1990*	9,241 (29.4%)	5,940 (18.9%)	10,727 (34.1%)	2,885 (9.2%)	2,658 (8.5%)	31,451 (100.1%)

Source: Wei-der Shu.

*Based on Taiwanese population aged sixteen and over living in the United States. The original source is *1990 Census of Population (Asian and Pacific Islanders in the United States), 1990 CP-3-5*, Table 4, published by U.S. Census Bureau, 1993.

†Includes two business owners.

‡Includes thirteen business owners/partners. The typical businesses run by these activists include motels (four persons), engineering consultant firms (two persons), and other small business. I assume that all these business owners also work as management staff, which is common for Taiwanese residing in the United States.

§Includes nine business owners/partners.

conclude that overseas TIM has drawn the majority of its adherents from the occupational categories of the broad "professional middle class." This is not surprising given their astonishing high level of educational attainment.

Second, a comparison of figures in the column "Taiwanese living in the United States, 1990," shows that the proportion of professional and managerial occupations among the activists (almost 80 percent) is much larger than for Taiwanese in general (only about 50 percent). And while very few activists worked for nonprofessional/managerial occupations, a certain proportion of Taiwanese made their living in either technical, sales, and administrative support occupations (34.1 percent) or service occupations (9.2 percent).

Conclusion

To summarize, overseas TIM activists typically are *native Taiwanese*, the main ethnic group in Taiwan. They were born in *the 1930s and 1940s*, and joined the movement in their mid to late twenties. They were predominantly *male* and from *southern Taiwan*, especially *Tainan*. They constitute a *well-educated group*, many of them having obtained a doctoral or master's degree from universities in North America. Accordingly, they are concentrated in the *professional and managerial specialty occupations*.

What, in the light of the foregoing, can we conclude regarding our understanding about the contention between the "marginality" thesis and the "privilege" thesis in terms of the social origins of overseas TIM activists? To begin with, it seems that the empirical data are more likely to fit the prediction of the privilege thesis, since most of the activists could be broadly categorized as middle class in origin. Why is the middle class more susceptible to joining the overseas TIM? Why do people from non-middle-class backgrounds have difficulty joining the overseas TIM? We have to understand this phenomenon from the perspective of a "*student movement*." Most of the activists in this study came to North America as graduate students first. Then, after earning their degree, they found jobs and stayed there. Accordingly, most of them began to participate in the overseas TIM under the status of "students." Given students' privileged access to *free time* compared with employees of similar age, their articulateness, and the natural tendency of young people toward *rebellious idealism*, student politics tend to be activistic and radical.

However, it seems that the marginality thesis is not totally irrelevant to our empirical result. First, one can argue that all native Taiwanese are almost by definition marginal, as the Mainlander-led KMT government systematically and consciously infused them with a deep sense of inferiority. Second, after coming to North America for advanced studies, many of the young Taiwanese also underwent a painful process of what psychologists call

"marginalization," both intellectually and emotionally. They were torn between the values of the two cultures. Many became activists of the TIM after being exposed to liberal professors, who more often than not criticized the KMT's record on the Mainland and attributed the debacle of 1949 to the corruption and ineffectual leadership of the KMT.

Conclusively, if we defined "marginality" by socioeconomic indicators, then the overwhelmingly middle-class activists of the TIM are a challenge to the marginality thesis. However, if we expanded the referred scope of the definition of marginality to include the psychological dimension, we have to acknowledge that most of the activists share the characteristics of marginality to some extent.

Why does the empirical evidence of this study support two competing theses at the same time? Probably this paper asks the wrong question, since the contention between the marginality thesis and the privilege thesis is not really an interesting puzzle waiting for the researcher's continuous quest. To me, there are at least two reasons for this. First, the concepts like the marginality and privilege themselves are troublesome to some degree. For instance, if the notion of marginality was so broadly defined as to apply to the virtually diversified dimensions in the social, psychological, economic, or even historical sense, it may be that marginality is a *human* characteristic and not an attribute of political activists. Should this be the case, all findings concerning marginality, this study included, are no findings at all. Second, but probably more important than the truth or falsity of both theses, is their insufficiency. Even if the activists' privileged background does contribute to political activism, a much larger number of people exhibited the same characteristics, but did not join the movement. In other words, rather than the social background, we have to consider some other factors, besides social background, influencing people's decision to join social movements.

I have just focused on my fourteen life histories and Dang's (1991) blacklist record. The themes detailed here may or may not be evident when covering other, more comprehensive data sets. It would be useful to look at some other data sets to conduct a more systematic analysis in the future. I have also focused only on one social movement organization (i.e., WUFI) within the overseas TIM. The information about all other major organizations like the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) obviously deserve future attention.

Notes

1. To my best knowledge, the only relatively comprehensive accounts of this subject published in English are by Douglas Mendel (1970) and Mei-Ling Wang (1999).

The best Chinese work in this field is by Ming-Cheng Chen, though this is written in a journalistic style. Similarly, other recent works (Chia-shu Huang 1994; Geoffroy 1997) provide only the chronological description, rather than an explanation of the TIM. None of these works offers a thorough sociological analysis of the emergence of the TIM.

2. The implication of this "discontinuity" is that there are "normal," legitimate, conventional actors on the one hand and there are "abnormal," illegitimate, and unconventional actors on the other. Of course, clandestine political organizations are seen as a kind of "abnormal" collective action in this approach.

3. It is difficult to categorize the fruitful and diversified literature on political activism in the sociological field of social movements. Furthermore, categorizing theories into broad groups is necessarily a "reductionist" task, since no individual theory may be justly treated in such an exercise. Nonetheless, the categorization is heuristic in that it gives researchers a starting point from which we can approach a synthesis.

4. ETA is a Basque underground organization advocating Basque nationalism.

5. I am being deliberately vague by not attaching a table here with the profiles of my interviewees. It would have provided the readers with greater understanding, but it would also have made it easier to identify the interviewees.

6. I acknowledge that this kind of information meets the problem of "representation," since there probably emerges an overrepresentation of the especially "bold and enterprising leading forces in the underground organizations" (Waldmann 1986, 264). However, this was the only source of interviews at the initial stage.

7. The KMT government used this "blacklist policy" as a vehicle for political control from the 1950s until the early 1990s.

8. I also obtained TIM-related information from some other published sources, which include (1) the biographies of individual activists; (2) written material from the activists themselves—pamphlets, papers, essay selections, newspaper articles, or interviews; (3) overseas TIM publications; and (4) secondary data relevant to the overseas TIM. For the more comprehensive lists about published sources of the overseas TIM, refer to Shu (1996b, Appendix).

9. It is notable that the first call for Taiwan Independence came long before the Incident. In 1928, the Taiwanese Communist Party (Taiwan gongchandang), which existed as the national branch (minzu zhi bu) of the Japanese Communist Party (Riben gongchandang) then, had advocated the idea already (Chen Fang-ming 1994, 290–295). However, since the nature of "Taiwan independence" before World War II, at the time Taiwan was ruled by the Japanese colonial government, is quite different from that after World War II, when Taiwan was ruled by the KMT government, I will ignore the former in this paper.

10. There are different versions about the exact wording of these "3 Fs" in the existing literature. For instance, 3F is described as Free Formosans' Formosa by Chen Fang-ming (1992, 81), as Free Formosan's Formosa by Huang (1994, 27, 296), as Formosans for Free Formosa by Copper (2000, 90). In this paper, I follow Cheng-san Li's work (1998) to describe the 3F as Formosans' Free Formosa, since this project is based upon Li's newly conducted interviews with the original founders of 3F.

11. Peng, then a professor of political science at National Taiwan University, was arrested for drafting "A Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation," in 1964. This advocated the ideal of "One China, One Taiwan" as the final resolution to the so-called China question. For Peng's biography, refer to Peng (1972) and Sung (1996).

12. For the detailed description of the evolution of publications by overseas TIM, refer to Shu (1996b).

13. All names used in this paper are pseudonyms. The quotations from "Life History #XX," which appear throughout this paper, refer to the transcription of the interviews conducted for this study.

14. There can be some confusion here. While my previous term the "1930s and 1940s generations" refers to people born in the 1930s and 1940s, the current term "1960s historical generation" means people, most of whom were youth, actively participating in the various movements of the 1960s. Accordingly, these two terms probably indicate the same group of people.

15. The discussion in this paragraph is based on the data from my case studies only, since neither blacklist record includes information about the exact year when the respondent joined the TIM.

16. The fourth and fifth pools are Chiayi (7.1 percent, 10.5 percent, and 9.5 percent, respectively) and Ilan (14.3 percent, 6.6 percent, and 9.5 percent, respectively). The phenomena also deserve further attention because the opposition force in both Chiayi and Ilan is relatively strong, when compared with that in some other counties in Taiwan.

17. The "Chia (Chiayi)-Nan (Tainan) Plain," located in southern Taiwan, is the major and largest plain in Taiwan. Tainan County is part of the Chia-Nan Plain.

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