INSTRUMENTAL STRATEGY OR SYMBOLIC REALIGNMENT:
A RHETORIC ANALYSIS OF ONE DOCUMENT OF "POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF PALESTINE"

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ABSTRACT: There are two different theories about the nature of rhetoric: instrumental strategy and symbolic realignment. The former perspective assumes the existence of "rationality" and focuses on whether the rhetoric is a right means to achieve a distinctive end. The latter approach addresses the nature of "non-negotiable demands" and focuses on the essential meaning of rhetoric itself. To resolve the argument between these two theories, I explore the intrinsic property of rhetoric through examining one document of the "Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine." After reviewing the context, critical events, actors, and key words of this document, I find the existence of dual nature of rhetoric and suggest a continuum perspective of seeing the rhetoric as both strategical reasoning and psychological satisfaction.

INTRODUCTION

Despite recent advances in the sociological theories of social movements, the nature of rhetoric in social movements remains obscure and unclear. Basically, the sociologists of social movements seldom deal with the concept of rhetoric directly and comprehensively.[2] Most of the works about the rhetoric of social movements are provided by rhetorical scholars in the field of speech communication. According to these rhetorical scholars, there are two competing perspectives about the nature of movement rhetoric: "instrumental strategy" and "symbolic realignment" (Goldzwig, 1989).[3] The former acknowledges the assumption of "rationality" and focuses on whether the rhetoric is a right and proper means to achieve a specific end, whereas the latter argues the nature of "non-negotiable demands" and focuses on the essential meaning and symbolic dimension of the rhetoric itself.

In this paper, I will explore the rhetoric of one document (*Statement by the PFLP Announcing Its Withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the PLO*) of the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a fraction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to examine the nature of rhetoric of a social movement organization.

A persistent dynamic dominating Palestinian political discourse since the beginning of the occupation was the unspoken opposition between the liberationist strategy and the territorial search for statehood. During the early 1970s, this dynamic was resolved overwhelming in favor of the liberationist strategy of the main guerrilla contingents of the Palestinian national movement (Tamari, 1991: 57). While a gradual shift away from this position was evident in the resolutions of the Palestine National Council (PNC) as of 1974 (Gresh, 1988: xi), the mystique and rhetoric of armed struggle continued to dominate through the rest of the decade.

In this study, I will begin with a literature review of the contention between different rhetorical theories, i.e., instrumental strategy theory and symbolic realignment theory. Next, I will introduce the methodology adopted by this study. Then, I will overview the content of this document, which serves as a basis for the subsequent examination of the nature of rhetoric. Concluding comments argue the necessity of treating rhetoric as a continuum between instrumental strategy and symbolic realignment, review the theoretical implications of the discovery for the sociological study of social movements, suggest directions for future research, and point out the limitations of this study.

LITERATURE REVIEW — INSTRAMENTAL STRATEGY VERSUS SYMBOLIC REALIGNMENT

Originally, rhetoric means "the art of speaking and writing with the purpose of persuading or influencing others"(Rosenbaum, 1993: 1038). Here, "rhetoric" is not meant a mere verbal shell game. Rather, rhetoric is "the art of probing what men believe they ought to believe, rather than proving what is true according to abstract methods" (Booth, 1974: xiii). Because the document I choose for this study could be seen as a revolutionary rhetoric[4], I would review the rhetorical literatures relating to the nature of revolutionary rhetoric particularly.

There are various theoretical approaches of studying social movements in the field of speech communication. For example, Andrews (1983) argued that rhetorical behaviors must be interpreted by relating them to specific "historical" contexts. Cathcart (1983) viewed the rhetoric of social movements as essentially contested "moral" struggles indicating the presence of "dialectical enjoinment." McGee (1983) used a meaning-centered approach. Stewart (1983) studied rhetoric as a primary "agency" for the realization of "functions" necessary to sustain movement viability. Although the difficulties of classifying these approaches into instrumental strategy theory or symbolic realignment theory, I think to some degree Andrews (1983) and Stewart (1983) shared the assumption of seeing rhetoric as a strategy, and Cathcart (1983) and Stewart (1983) adopted the assumption of treating rhetoric as a symbolic interaction.

On the one hand, to the instrumental strategy theorists, the revolutionary or other military means has many rhetorical functions. As Burgess (1973: 71) argued,"Perhaps only dramatic moments of coercion can fully reveal to individuals, institutions, and to their leaders, the depth, breadth, and the power of the many silent agreements upon which a viable society is built." Indeed, expressions of violence and violent conflict actually can serve society by uncovering frustrations and problems that would remain unaccounted for otherwise; they allow one to "vent" social rage and powerlessness. In the sense, the rhetoric could be seen as embracing all the available means of influencing human behavior and to recognize that some of these means like revolution are persuasive and some are not. The revolutionary rhetoric is the product of "careful cost-benefit calculations."

On the other hand, symbolic realignment theorists refer to the creation of an alternative rhetorical reality; speakers and audiences become convinced of the existence of, and therefore, become involved in, an alternative world-view. A rhetoric uses extra-conventional or non-traditional languaging strategies that create and cooperation in others, either directly or indirectly, for the expressed purposes of subverting salient aspects of the status quo; affirming *other* aspects of society; and "realigning" political, social, or cultural meanings or "realities" (Goldzwig, 1989: 208; Wilkinson, 1976).

In sum, while the instrumental strategy theorists adopt the logic of rationality and functional requirements to explain the emergence of revolutionary rhetoric, the symbolic realignment theorists would see the revolutionary rhetoric as one kind of collective identity and symbolic expression beyond the logic of rationality.

METHODOLOGY

Before introducing the methodology of this paper, I think I must defend my choice of this document --- *Statement by the PFLP Announcing Its Withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the PLO* (hereafter called *Statement*) --- as my analyzing object on two different levels. On the one hand, I must address the validity of selecting a single text as my analyzing material. According to Smith and Windes (1978: 116), while a broad data base is necessary for theory construction and testing, a more limited object like a single text can serve to illustrate certain movement-specific formulas. That is to say, to some degree I would posit my research as a preliminary study. I attempt to discover some rhetorical characteristics of the PFLP (or even the PLO) for future systematic research.

On the other hand, I have to contend the appropriateness of selecting this document, not other documents. The reason is that the features of the PFLP's rhetoric are reflected in the insistence of armed struggle and the holistic liberationist strategy. This document could be seen as the representative of this type of rhetoric.

Four basic steps adopted in this paper provide a rudimentary procedure for identifying the rhetoric of the *Statement*, i.e., analyzing the *context* of this *Statement*, presenting the *critical events* reflected in this *Statement*, examining the *actors* of this *Statement*, and exploring the *key words* related to the actors in this *Statement*. First, it is essential to familiarize myself with the PFLP's *context* for interpreting its discourse and rhetoric. I will gather information from a number of secondary sources --- e.g., Gresh, 1988; Alexander and Sinai, 1989; Mishal, 1986; and Miller, 1983. Although most of the works are provided by relevant scholarship, especially the field of international relations, not sociology, I will benefit from these materials through understanding the context of the PFLP's rhetoric.

After reviewing the context of the PFLP, I will adopt Burke's (1968) conception of "dramatism" as a framework to analyze this *Statement*. For Burke (1968: 446), dramatism centers in observations of this sort: for there to be an *act*, there must be an *agent*. Similarly, there must be a *scene* in which the agent acts. To act in a scene, the agent must employ some means, or *agency*. And it can be called an act in the full sense of the term only if it involves a *purpose*. These five terms (*act, scene, agent, agency, purpose*) have been labeled the dramatistic elements. Thus, my second task will become to identify the

"critical events" presenting in the *Statement* to examine the background in which the *Statement* emerged.

Thirdly, for Burke (1968: 445), the dramatistic approach is implicit in the key term "act." "Act" is thus a terministic center from which many related considerations can be shown to "radiate." But, my starting point will not be the "act" as Burke's conception. Rather, I will focus on the "actors" from which other related terms are derived. I will classify the actors of this *Statement* into three categories --- the Palestinians (including the Palestinian people in general and the various Palestinian organizations in particular), the Arab (including the Arab people in general and the different Arab nations in particular), and the enemy of the Palestinian national movement (including Zionism and Imperialism).

Finally, I will attempt to identify and mark the "vehicle" (or key words) related to the actors adopted by the PFLP in this *Statement*. In other words, the noun, adjective, and verb related to the actors will be listed and calculated the frequencies in this step.

RESULTS

The Context of the PFLP's Rhetoric

The PFLP is Fatah's[5] primary rival within the PLO[6] and claims to offer a fundamentally different ideological and organizational approach to achieve Palestinian goals. Founded in late 1967, the PFLP has its roots in the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM)[7] and in the political styles of its two principal founders, George Habbash and Wadi Haddad --- both from Greek Orthodox Christian backgrounds. Unlike Fatah, the PFLP adopted a Marxist-oriented approach, which it believed to be better suited to the social and economic conditions of the area. Moreover, based on the pan-Arabist thought, the PFLP, as its name suggests (i.e., the Popular Front), espoused an alliance between the Arab masses and truly progressive regimes against Zionism, imperialism, and the forces of Arab reaction (Miller, 1983: 47-8).

The PFLP's small size and revolutionary outlook also led it into the world of transnational terrorism and into close association with other revolutionary movements (Miller, 1983: 48). For example, so-called "Black September" was conducted by members of the PFLP in 1970. They hijacked Swissair, TWA, and BOAC airplanes and forced them to fly to Jordan (Mishal, 1986: 14).[8]

Nonetheless, the PFLP's uncompromising position on Israel, its willingness to use any tactic to advance its cause, and Habbash's dynamic leadership over the years have given it an influence far beyond its size (Miller, 1983: 49). For example, after the October War of 1973[9] the PLO became more even aware of its limitations. It became clear that Arafat was not unwilling to consider the creation of a Palestinian ministate in the West Bank and Gaza. However, the PFLP resigned from the PLO Executive Committee and united with several other groups to form a Front of Palestinian Forces Rejecting Surrenderist Solutions --- the Rejection Front (Alexander and Sinai, 1989: 15). They described Arafat and other leaders of the PLO as "surrenderist leaders" (Lukacs, 1992: 314), rejected to accept the idea of creating a ministate in the West Bank and Gaza, and announced this famous *Statement*.

The Critical Events in the *Statement*

In this section, I try to find the "background" reflected in the *Statement* through counting the frequencies of some critical events. The critical events which the *Statement* mentioned include the October War (in October 1973, 3 times), the Geneva Conference (in December 1973, 6 times)[10], the 12th session of the Palestine National Council (1-9 June, 1974, 6 times), and the Egypt-Jordan Communique (2 times) (Gresh, 1988: x-xi). Basically, the mainstream atmosphere which the *Statement* emerged reflected the thought of political resolution of the Palestinian question. In the post-October War era, the readiness of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria to launch a diplomatic initiative to regain the occupied territories from Israel increased the PLO's (especially Fatah's) concern about a political settlement in the West Bank and Gaza without its participation and encouraged it to consider adopting political means to regain these areas of Palestine (Mishal, 1986: 93-4).

The Actors in the *Statement*

Trying to fight against the atmosphere of so-called "political resolution", the *Statement* illustrates symbolic expression motivated by an attempt to identify the antagonists and to create conflict with concerned antagonists and their clients. In TABLE 1, I try to find the "actors" in the *Statement* through counting the frequencies of some key proper nouns.

TABLE 1. The Actors in the Statement

Category	Actors	Frequencies
Category of Palestinians	Palestinians	14[a]
	PFLP	4
	Executive Commi-\ ttee (of PLO)	7
	PLO	28[b]
	PNC	7
Category of Arab Nations	Arab	17[c]
	Jordan	16
	Egypt	3
	Saudi (Arabia)	1
	Lebanon	1
Category of Antagonists	Israel	9
	America	6

a. Basically, this item refers to the Palestinian people only. It also includes "Palestinian revolution" (5 times), "Palestinian and Arab revolution" (1 time), and "Arab and Palestinian masses" (1 time). It is notable that organizations like "Palestine Liberation Organization" or "Palestine National Council" are not included in this item.
b. In this *statement*, there are different "directions" of the description of the PLO in different contexts. It includes negative description (14 times), neutral description (12 times), and positive description (2 times).
c. There are also different "directions" of the description of the term Arab. There are 14 times of neutral description (including "Arab situation" (1 time), "Arab territory" (1 time), "Arab nations" (5 times), "Arab-Israeli conflict" (1 time), "Arab masses" (2 times), "Arab and Palestinian masses" (4 times), and "Arab Summit Conference" (1 time)). There are 3 times of negative description (including "surrenderist Arab regimes" (1 time), "Arab forces" (1 time), and "Arab reactions" (1 time)).
SOURCE: Lukacs, 1992: 312-7

There are some interesting insights revealed by TABLE 1. First, we can find an obvious cleavage among the "good actors of we-group," the "reactionary (bad) actors of we-group," and the "bad actors of they-group" in this *statement*. According to the *statement*,

> The battle is a continuous one and being fought between Israel, Jordan reaction and the surrenderist forces on the one hand and the Palestinian and Arab revolution on the other, and no power on earth will be able to keep this fact from masses" (quoted in Lukacs, 1992: 316).

Secondly, the Table also demonstrates that only the Palestinians and the PFLP could be classified as "good actors of we-group." The other actors of we-group like the Executive Committee, the PLO, or even the PNC and almost every mentioned Arab nations (e.g.,Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arab, and Lebanon) would be seen as "reactionary actors." Moreover, the *Statement* is in accordance with the general assumption about the severe conflict between the Palestinians and the antagonists (i.e., Zionism or Israel, and Imperialism or America).

Thirdly, it is surprising that the frequencies of negative PLO (14 times) or Jordan (16 times) are much greater than Israel (9 times) or America (6 times). It means the most critical antagonists in the *Statement* are "reactionary actors of we-group," especially the PLO itself and the reactionary Arab nations like Jordan. It implies that the key logic of this rhetoric is based on the "moral problem" of the Palestinians and Arab states who are ready to negotiate with the Zionism and imperialism. In other words, to the leaders of PFLP, the most serious problem for the business of Palestinian liberation is not the obstacle of antagonists (since it is nature for them to obstruct this great business). Rather, the "we-group's" attempt to negotiate with the antagonists is the most obvious problem for the business of liberation. According to the *Statement*,

> . . . it became clear that what the surrenderist forces were talking of was the tactics misleading fellow-travellers and the masses, rather than misleading the enemy (quoted in Lukacs, 1992: 314).

Fourthly, it is notable that the negative description of the general term "Arab" (3 times, while the total frequency is 17 times) is relatively less than the negative description of the term "PLO" (14 times, while the total frequency is 28 times). It implies that although the *Statement* vilifies almost every Arab nations it mentioned, the rhetoric still emphasizes the importance of pan-Arab thought and the critical role played by Arab people and nations in the Palestinian struggle.

Finally, the logic of this rhetoric does not start from the consideration of whether "we-group" will benefit from the adopted strategy or action. Rather, the logic of thinking will focus on whether "antagonists" will benefit from the adopted strategy or action. The rhetoric reveals that any strategy proposed by the antagonists must be in conflict with the interest of we-group. The rhetoric denies any possibility of accommodation between we-group and the antagonists.

The Vehicles Related to the Actors in the *Statement*

In TABLE 2, we can find the "vehicles (key words)" related to the different actors in this *Statement*. There are some insights revealed by this Table. First, for the PFLP, the most critical vehicles related to the Palestinians are "masses" (19 times) and "revolution" (16 times, or 24 times, while adding the frequency of other words related to revolution). We could say that the core of the PFLP's rhetoric is "mass revolution". The "practical" effect of revolution against the Israel and the imperialism is probably less important than the act of revolution itself. The rhetoric of "mass revolution itself" could be found in the *Statement*,

The value of the Palestinian revolution is that it should provide the pattern in accordance with which the masses of the whole Arab nation can settle their conflict with their enemies by force of arms through a people's war of liberation, rather than through laxness and surrenderism under the auspices of a balance of forces which means that the price paid for every piece of land we recover is higher than the value of the land itself" (quoted in Lukacs, 1992: 313).

TABLE 2. Vehicles Related to Actors in the *Statement*

Category	Vehicles (Key Words)	Frequencies
Category of Palestinians	Masses	19[a]
	Land	2
	National unity	4
	Revolution(ary)	16[b]
	Other words related to revolution	8[c]
	Surrender(ism)	4
	Lax	1
Category of Arab Nations	Masses	3[d]
	Revolution(ary)	2
	Subservient	9
	Surrender(ism)	6
	Lax(ness)	3
	Reaction	5
Category of Antagonists	Enemy	4
	Imperialist	8
	Liquidation	11

a. It includes "Arab and Palestinian masses" (3 times).
b. It includes "Palestinian revolution" (5 times) and "Palestinian and Arab revolution" (1 time).
c. It includes "movement" (2 times), "opposition" (1 time), "mobilize" (1 time), "armed war" (1 time), "confrontation" (1 time), and "rejection" (2 times).
d. All three appear in the form of "Arab and Palestinian masses."
SOURCE: Lukacs, 1992: 312-7

That is to say, on an ideal level, the Palestinians should adopt the means of mass revolution to fight against the antagonists. Unfortunately, on a practical level, the atmosphere of political resolution led many Palestinians, including some leaders of the PLO, attempted to adopt a "surrenderist" (4 times) and "lax" (1 time) manner to negotiate with the enemies. However, we find the rhetoric of this *Statement*, while related to the Palestinians, emphasizes more on the ideal level than on the practical level.

Secondly, in terms of the vehicles related to the Arab nations, on the one hand, the basic tone could be seen as a negative rhetoric appearing in words like "subservience" (9 times), "surrender" (6 times), "laxness" (3 times), and "reaction" (5 times). On the other hand, the positive rhetoric like "masses" (3 times) or "revolution" (2 times) is relatively less important than the negative description. We could conclude that the *Statement*, while related to the Arab nations, focuses more on the practical level (i.e., the attempt to negotiate with the antagonists) than on the ideal level (i.e., the effort to fight against the antagonists).

Finally, consistent with what one expects, the rhetoric of vilifying the bad actors of they-group is very clear. All the vehicles related to the Israel and America are absolutely negative words like "enemy" (4 times), "imperialist" (8 times), and "liquidation" (11 times). Without exception the PFLP articulated the actors like Israel and America with completely negative rhetoric.

DISCUSSION

After examining the rhetoric of this *Statement*, I must attempt to answer the original questions I raised in this paper --- what the nature of revolutionary rhetoric might be. While the instrumental strategy theorists assume the existence of rationality and emphasize the importance of strategic and instrumental reasoning, the symbolic realignment theorists emphasize on the logic of expressive function and focus on the critical role played by the nonnegotiable demands. To what degree could the rhetoric be seen as a part of the instrumental strategy, and to what degree could the rhetoric be seen as a part of the non-negotiable identity?

Seeing the Revolutionary Rhetoric as Instrumental Strategy

In this section, I would adopt the *functional* perspective to analyze the empirical data. For Merton (1968: 79), the term "social function" refers to the *observable objective consequences*, not the subjective dispositions. In other words, to explore the nature of revolutionary rhetoric of that *Statement*, one has to examine the "objective consequences" of the announcement of this *Statement*, including disadvantages and advantages, for the different levels of targets (i.e., the individual participants, the PFLP, and Palestinian national movement).

First, in terms of the individual participants of this rhetoric, it seems that the rhetoric of revolution involved by the radical members of the PFLP might be seen as self-sacrifice and high risk. For the individual participants, the cost for the rhetoric like "revolution," "opposition," "armed war," or "confrontation" was relatively high while compared with other means like political resolution. Many activists in events like hijacking or military attack were wounded, or even loss their lives.

Of course, I recognize that the goal-achievement of Palestinian national movement would benefit the participants themselves to some degree, since most of the participants were Palestinians, who could be described as "beneficiaries" according to McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1221). But I would argue that the accomplishment of "abstract" collective-goal of the movement seems to be more important than the gain of "concrete" individual-reward for the activists of this revolutionary rhetoric.

Secondly, while considering the objective consequences of the revolutionary rhetoric for the PFLP itself, there emerges both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, since the primary targets in the *Statement* are the "bad actors of we-group" (the PLO could be seen as number one) rather than the "bad actors of they-group," it seems that the PFLP gained some credibility in the situation of competing authentic spokesmen for the whole Palestinian interest. The revolutionary rhetoric has the following positive functions for the PFLP: (1) characterizing the critical events (e.g., October War and Geneva Conference) in a manner that can emotionally charge political issues; (2) serving as a signal that one is attempting to violate existing conventions (i.e., demonstrating the efforts of rejecting any proposal of resolving the Palestinian question through political resolution); (3) being employed as a key polarization tactic by making "enemies" (both the "bad actors of we-group" and the "bad actors of they-group") of the opposition; (4) enhancing the self-esteem and concept of "selfhood" of the agitators by humiliating the enemy (e.g., describing the reactionary actors as surrenderist and lax and reflecting itself as non-surrenderist and non-lax); (5) helping gain mass-media attention (e.g., highlighting the conflict situation with both the reactionary actors and the antagonists); (6) posing problems for established institutions (i.e., the PLO, especially the Fatah); (7) establishing the agitators' credibility with the converted (e.g., proving the PFLP's non-negotiable willingness to fight against the antagonists); and (8) lending cohesiveness to a movement and serving as a psychological tension release.

Nevertheless, the revolutionary rhetoric also resulted in some serious disadvantages for the PFLP. It is notable that after the announcement of the *Statement*, the next story was the PFLP's withdrawing from the Executive Committee of the PLO. At that time, the PLO had been recognized as the sole representative of Palestinian people by the international community. To withdraw from the PLO means nothing "substantial" left, except the insistence of the ideology and the rhetoric of revolution. In sum, because of the co-presence of advantages and disadvantages, it is really very difficult to calculate the cost and benefit of the revolutionary rhetoric exactly for the PFLP. But we could conclude that the revolutionary rhetoric is not the "simple" product of reflective feelings like anger or being upset.

Finally, while treating the PLO or the Palestinian national movement as the concerning target, there also emerges both advantages and limitations. On the one hand, the rhetoric of mass revolution and rejection of any political settlement demonstrated in the *Statement* has cost the Palestinian movement dearly in material and political terms. First, it seems that the rhetoric has never been an effective weapon against the *antagonists*. Since the priority target of the *Statement* is not Israel or America, the rhetoric has had little chance of increasing Palestinian leverage over Israel and America or of weakening the morale of Israel and America. Secondly, the rhetoric of attacking *conservative Arab regimes* alienated important supporters and left a legacy of suspicion that still affects PLO relations with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. A third problem has been that the rhetoric of radical revolution has resulted in the PFLP's severe conflict with some other *more moderate organizations* such as Fatah. However, the fragmentation within a social movement usually weakens the capacity of fighting against the antagonists. The result was that the PFLP had claimed to withdraw from the Executive Committee of the PLO. Finally, the rhetoric of rejecting any political resolution has severely injured the PLO's *international image* and give the Israelis the powerful legitimacy to conduct

their own military strategy. Far from weakening Israeli morale, the rhetoric has strengthened Israeli resolve and increased its hostility toward Palestinians[11].

On the other hand, there are also some advantages of the rhetoric. First, the rhetoric of "hard" revolution like the military and terrorist operations has clearly enhanced the PLO's *visibility* --- a critical objective for any resistance movement. Whenever a social movement organization adopts a strongly ideological statement, the mass media responds immediately and reinforces the strength of that rhetoric to some degree[12]. Secondly, the rhetoric of revolution has also forced the Arab states and the international community to take the Palestinian grievances seriously. For example, the effort of both the USSR and the USA to resolve the Palestinian question at the 1973 Geneva Conference could be seen as an immediate response to the 1973 October War. Thirdly, it seems that the PFLP's revolutionary rhetoric indeed demonstrates some advantages for the whole Palestinian national movement, especially the Fatah itself. The strictly radical rhetoric of the PFLP would reveal the nature of more moderate rhetoric of the Fatah. To some degree, the existence of the PFLP would increase the Fatah's chips while negotiating with the antagonists or other Arab nations.

However, in terms of material and political gains of the rhetoric for the PLO, it seems that we are also facing difficulties of calculating the net benefit of this rhetoric. Although the existence of advantages of enhancing visibility, forcing the international community to take the Palestinian question seriously, and increasing the chips of Fatah, there also emerges limitations of the revolutionary rhetoric like the inefficacy of threatening the antagonists, the decreasing support from Arab regimes, the conflict with other Palestinian organizations, and the injury to the PLO's international image. However, we must recognize that the PFLP's revolutionary rhetoric benefitted the whole Palestinian national movement to some degree, although it is really very difficult to calculate the cost and benefit of the rhetoric exactly.

Conclusively, the revolutionary rhetoric could be seen as the product of careful cost-benefit calculations on the levels of the PFLP and the PLO, although it seems that the assumption of rationality is not suitable on the level of individual participants.

Seeing the Revolutionary Rhetoric as Symbolic Realignment

What is the alternative logic of explaining the adoption of this rhetoric? According to the aforementioned rhetorical analysis, it seems that the effectiveness of the revolutionary rhetoric must be measured more in its impact on Palestinians and the PFLP (or PLO) than on Israel. However limited its strategic value, confrontation with Israel had an important psychological impact on the Palestinians and the PFLP (or PLO) during critical periods in the development of the Palestinian national movement. It provided a sense of independence and a rallying point for the frustrations and hopes of a displaced and alienated people. It gave the PFLP legitimacy and credibility among the Palestinian and Arab masses at a moment when their own leaders had failed to deliver on their promises to regain Palestine. In other words, the value of the rhetoric was based on its "nonnegotiable" property --- the PFLP could not and was not willing to negotiate with the antagonists and any surrenderist Palestinian and Arab leaders.

In other words, the revolutionary rhetoric itself created the reality of the PFLP. Cathcart (1978: 235-6) argued that confrontation is or must be an "agnostic ritual" that is

automatically played out. He said, "It [agnostic ritual] is a means of reaffirming loyalties . . . ., always expressed in a kind of muted symbolic display designed to elicit a symbolic response" (Cathcart, 1978: 235). Also, Scott and Smith (1969: 4) contended that confrontation which is "cleavage of exploitation"[13] can become an all consuming drama in which people simply become characters engaging in "the rite of the kill." The episodes of hijacking during the Black September demonstrate the fact that those radical activists were controlled by this drama (or rhetoric) of Palestinian liberation itself.

I would introduce a very common concept --- normative orientation --- to complement the problem of the instrumental strategy theorists' assumption of rationality. Here, normative orientation means the psychological processes related to the "assumed" achievements of collective goals. In other words, the "practical" success against the Israelis gained by the rhetoric of revolution is less important than the rhetoric of revolution itself. The reason why the PFLP adopted the rhetoric is that the leaders of this organization (and the potential audience) gained some kind of psychological satisfaction over and beyond any visible benefits produced by the organization.

In sum, it seems that both the instrumental strategy theorists' assumption of "pure" rationality and the symbolic realignment theorists' assumption of "pure" identity are questionable. Indeed, the whole question of the extent to which men ever have a completely free choice, for example, is a profound philosophical one. Furthermore, men may act against their inclinations at the behest of powers outside themselves and are said to be "persuaded" to do so. We could withdraw the conclusion that the nature of revolutionary rhetoric might be both strategical reasoning and psychological satisfaction. Therefore, I would suggest a continuum perspective of the nature movement or revolutionary rhetoric:

> The social movements or revolutionary rhetoric becomes less rational and more expressive to the extent that in some specific rhetorical context; and the reverse in some other specific rhetorical context.

Unfortunately, the data in this paper is not strong enough for me to suggest under what specific rhetorical situation the more rational rhetoric would emerge and under what specific situation the more expressive rhetoric would appear.

CONCLUSION

What is the theoretical implication of the dual nature of revolutionary rhetoric for the sociological study of social movements? How can we feedback to the sociological theories of social movements from the grounded empirical discoveries? Being a student of sociology in general, and social movements in particular, I think it is my obligation to provide some suggestion about the theoretical contention in the field of social movements.

In the sociological field of social movements, the resource mobilization theory (e.g., Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973) could be seen as the mainstream theory in the recent literatures of social movements, especially in American empirical sociology. However, partially due to the challenge from European "new social movements"[14] in 1980s, there emerges a new, but not yet very unified theoretical approach --- identity-oriented theory (e.g., Touraine, 1981;

Melucci, 1985). On the one hand, drawing on the work of Olson (1965), the resource mobilization theorists adopted the neo-utilitarian logic imputed to collective actors. The "rational actor" (individual and group), employing strategic and instrumental reasoning, could be seen as the central referent for the analysis of social movements. On the other hand, being sympathetic to the work of neo-Marxism, the identity-oriented theorists maintained that one cannot see a movement as the product of the neoutilitarian, rational actor. Instead, the nature of social movements, together with the nature of revolutionary rhetoric, entails something other than strategic or instrumental rationality.

To some degree, the disagreement between resource mobilization theory and identity-oriented theory in the field of social movements is very similar to the theoretical argument between instrumental strategy theory and symbolic realignment theory in the field of speech communication. Since the empirical data suggests the treatment of seeing rhetoric as a continuum between rationality and expression, I would argue that the treatment reveals the necessity of the co-presence of resource mobilization theory and identity-oriented theory. In other words, social movements share the characteristics of rationality and identity together at the same time. Neglecting the importance of any characteristics could be seen as a serious limitation for the field of social movements. I would suggest that the relationship between the resource mobilization theory and the identity-oriented theory should be complementary, not conflicting.

Finally, I would point out the limitations of this study in some ways. First, I have just focused on one document of the PFLP in this paper. The themes detailed here may or may not be evident when covering other documents of the PFLP. It would be useful to look at a series of documents of the PFLP to conduct a systematic rhetorical analysis in the future.

Secondly, I have focused on only one organization's rhetoric within the PLO. The perspectives developed by all other major organizations like Fatah deserves future attention.

Thirdly, it would be worthwhile to study the revolutionary rhetoric as a response to the rhetoric of established order. In other words, the concept of "episodic discourse" (Moaddel, 1992) will be useful for future study to deal with the dynamic relationship between the Israeli rhetoric and the Palestinian rhetoric.

Being sociological students of social movements, we are just beginning to understand the nature of rhetoric and to develop the appropriate conceptual tools to explore the movement rhetoric. Pointing out the necessity of co-presence of resource mobilization theory and identity-oriented theory, I hope the contention between different theories about the nature of movement rhetoric could provide some useful insights about the nature of social movements themselves.

NOTES

2. There are only very few sociologists discussing the concept of rhetoric (e.g., Marshall, 1985, 1986; Blain, 1989, 1991; and Clarke, 1987). However, the "nature" of rhetoric is not taken seriously by movement researchers in sociology, compared with the rhetorical scholars in the field of speech communication.

3. Goldzwig (1989) did not adopt the term "instrumental strategy" in his paper. In his effort of constructing a new rhetoric theory of demagoguery, he distinguished the traditional rhetorical theory (or social movement theory and criticism, according to his terminology) and the new symbolic realignment theory. However, I would argue the term "instrumental strategy theory" is much better than the term "social movement theory and criticism."

4. According to Cameron (1966: 133), revolution could be defined as "long-term programs of violence aimed at the overthrow of the existing government." Thus, any discourse violating existing political order, violating accepted means, and inviting negative sanctions from established social leaders and institutions could be seen as a "revolutionary rhetoric."

5. The Fatah was founded by Yasir Arafat and his associates in Cairo, 1956 (Alexander and Sinai, 1989: 6). The Fatah constitutes the heart of the Palestinian resistance movement and represents the main center of power and authority within the PLO. It has more fighters, more money, and a broader range of support among Palestinians, Arab states, and the international community than all the other PLO groups combined (Miller, 1983: 42).

6. The PLO was created in January 1964 at the first Arab Summit Conference led by President Nasser of Egypt (Alexander and Sinai, 1989: 8). Originally, the PLO, created by the Arab leaders, could be seen as a means of siphoning off support from Fatah and other emerging Palestinian militant groups (Mansfield, 1979: 279-80).

7. The Arab Nationalist Movement is a pan-Arabist organization set up in Beirut in the 1950s which was to be Fatah's great rival. It was the ANM that was to give birth to the PFLP in 1967 (Gresh, 1987: 23). Many of the ANM leaders were not Palestinians or were born outside Palestine. They were mostly from the middle bourgeoisie, and several were non-Muslims (Gresh, 1987: 25).

8. Having lost the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, King Hussein of Jordan engaged in the task of consolidating his regime in Jordan, but found himself increasingly confronted with an ever-growing number of Palestinian guerrillas. Relations between the Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordan security forces rapidly worsened. In 1970, mounting hostilities between the PLO guerrillas and the Jordan army let to violent clashes and resulted in the civil war in Jordan (Alexander and Sinai, 1989: 9-10). The civil war was the background of the "Black September."

9. On October 6, 1973 Egyptian troops crossed into the then Israeli-occupied Sinai while Syrian forces rolled into the occupied Golan Heights in the North. The PLO's Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) had readied for battle. Totaling around 1,000 Palestinian fighters, prepared to move into Jordan in order to cross into Israel, but were refused to do so by King Hussein. (Alexander and Sinai, 1989:14-5)

10. The Geneva Conference was held two days in December 1973 after the October War of that year under the co-chairmanship of the USSR and the USA. Syria and the PLO were not represented in the conference. The conference was to discuss and seek resolution of the issue of Israelis withdrawal "from territories occupied in the 1967; the resolution of the Palestinian question......" (Gresh, 1988: xi; Mishal, 1986: 76);

11. Although adopting the rhetoric of armed struggle, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations seem to have never really possessed an effective military option against Israel. We must recognize that in terms of the military capacity, the Israeli formally trained army is much stronger than the Palestinian guerrilla organizations (Miller, 1983: 88).

12. Palmerton's (1988) work could be seen as a model of the connection of the "hard" rhetoric and media response. In the paper, he tried to examine television news coverage of the first days of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. Critical analysis of this coverage showed a pattern which reinforces the terrorist strategy by focusing causation for the crisis on institutional targets, and suggesting that military intervention would re-establish control.

13. Scott and Smith (1969: 2) argued that "Radical confrontation reflects a dramatic sense of division." To them, the language of the "haves" and the "have-nots" implies the inevitable symbolic deprivation between oppressor and oppressed. So-called "cleavage of exploitation" must be understood in this sense.

14. Basically, different from the American social movements specialists (especially the resource mobilization theorists), researchers of social movements in Europe are more concerned with the structurally determined growth of new protest potentials resulting from the development of Western industrial society. They argue that the new social movements --- such as the ecology movement, the antinuclear movement, the women's movement, the peace movement, and the squatters' movement --- differ from the old movements (the labor movement in particular) in values and issues, action forms, and constituencies (Kriesi, 1989: 1079).

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